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MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS  
Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson 
ABSTRACT 
Securities class actions play a crucial, if contested, role in the policing of securities fraud 
and the protection of securities markets. The theoretical understanding of these private 
enforcement claims needs to evolve to encompass the broader set of goals that underlie the 
securities regulatory impulse and the publicness of those goals. Further, a clear grasp of the 
modern securities class action also requires an updated understanding of how the role of market 
intermediation in securities transactions has reshaped the realities of securities litigation in public 
companies and the evolution of the fraud cause of action in the context of open-market 
transactions. The Supreme Court’s embrace of market efficiency as a mechanism to establish 
reliance in its 1988 decision, Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, illustrates the necessary adaptation of 
common law fraud to the modern market setting, and Congressional enactment of the PSLRA in 
1995 exemplifies the efforts to respond to the litigation risks inherent in that adaptation. 
Together, Basic and the PSLRA provide a frame for understanding both a series of recent 
Supreme Court decisions on securities class actions and a different understanding of the theory 
undergirding those class actions. To develop this understanding, we expand the conversation 
about the goals of securities regulation to include the set of goals that are rooted in publicness 
and focus on market protection, innovation, and growth, as well as stability and systemic 
considerations. We posit that this broader theoretical understanding explains why the Court 
rejected a challenge to the fraud on the market doctrine and, instead, permitted the continued use 
of market efficiency:  the Court chose to preserve the deterrence and enforcement role of these 
cases in promoting market growth and innovation. We then apply this understanding of 
publicness and market intermediation to the interpretation of the Court’s limited, but ambiguous, 
use of “price impact” in securities fraud cases. Our analysis reveals that the practical balance 
established by Basic and the PSLRA has prevailed over pure doctrinal approaches to issues like 
reliance or other, more incomplete theoretical explanations focused solely on compensation, 
deterrence, and investor protection, but neglecting the role of publicness in the securities 
markets. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The legitimacy and efficacy of Rule 10b-5 and the use of class actions to enforce it have 
been debated at great length.1 The initial judicial focus on the implication of a private right of 
action gave way to contests over the meaning of the elements of common law fraud and other 
prerequisites necessary to prove the cause of action.2 The seesaw pattern of the cases in the first 
half century of federal securities laws were enough to give a reader whiplash.3 Later 
Congressional and judicial action, such as the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 
(the PSLRA), inserted procedural hurdles to contain litigation agency costs and provided 
openings to vigorous contests over which elements of fraud are ripe for decision at early points 
in the litigation cycle.4 Over time, the fact of the 10b-5 cause of action has become more clear 
and permanent, but the interpretation of it has become more opaque and procedurally focused.5 A 
series of post-2010 Supreme Court cases focused on how much of the 10b-5 cause of action is 
fair game at the class certification phase of the litigation.6 In doing so, they illustrate the turn to 
procedure and the complexity and confusion that have come with it, while reaffirming the 
Court’s commitment to the securities class action as an enforcement and deterrence mechanism.  
But it was not just the law that changed; there were fundamental changes in the role of 
markets in securities transactions. The expanding role of market intermediation in securities 
transactions is important to understanding the evolution of the common law tort of deceit into 
today’s, fraud-on-the-market based 10b-5 class action, as well as to the specific issue of price 
impact. First, as the Supreme Court said in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the market is an unpaid agent 
of the investors in modern securities transactions.7 By adopting the fraud-on-the-market 
                                                 
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (prohibiting fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a security). 
2 A.C. Pritchard & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Law and the New Deal Justices, 95 VA. L. REV. 
841, 849 (2009). 
3 An initial long stretch of expansive holdings by the Supreme Court gave way to a seemingly 
unbroken run of restrictive opinions. See E. Thomas Sullivan & Robert B. Thompson, The Supreme Court 
and Private Law: The Vanishing Importance of Securities and Antitrust, 53 EMORY L. J. 1571 (2004) 
(showing expansive decisions from the late 1930s through the early 1970s and then twenty-four restrictive 
decisions and one expansive in the 1970s and 1980s after Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the court). 
See also, A. C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities 
Laws, 52 DUKE L. J. 841 (2003) (tracing the change from expansive to restrictive decisions to the 
influence of Justice Lewis Powell, appearing upon his arrival and disappearing with his retirement).  
4 See the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
5 John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early Assessment, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 
1 (2015). 
6 Those cases pushed two fraud elements—materiality and loss causation—out of the class certification 
phase and reaffirmed the Court’s pathbreaking Basic Inc. v. Levinson decision, published a quarter 
century earlier that embraced theories of market efficiency as the basis for a presumption of the reliance 
element of fraud. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
7 Basic, 485 at 244 (citing one of the early fraud-on-the-market cases, In re LTV Sec. Litig., 88 F.R.D. 
134, 143 (N.D.Tex. 1980)). That opinion, written by Patrick Higginbotham, later a judge on the 5th 
Circuit, also discussed the market’s role as a transmission belt for information. Id. 
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presumption, it recognized that the necessary connection between defendants’ misrepresentations 
and plaintiffs’ loss can be shown when, in an efficient market, the fraud is incorporated into the 
market price of a security and, thereby, impacts the investors’ decision to buy or sell stock.8 In 
doing so, the Court acknowledged the role of the market as an impersonal intermediator in the 
transmission of information in today’s securities transactions. Second, modern financial learning, 
including for example about diversification and portfolio theory, tells us that most shareholders 
own only a small percentage in any particular company and, thus, have little reason to be active 
investors, including, for example, suing when there is fraud.9 The class action mechanism brings 
efficiencies to this setting and, as the Court has recognized, is practically the only way private 
actions are likely to be brought, providing deterrence and enforcement of securities regulations.   
These legal developments and the new market realities have combined to poke holes in 
traditional theories for private enforcement. Diversified investors, particularly those following 
more passive investment strategies of relying on the market, may seem just as likely to be hurt by 
private fraud suits (as their portfolio companies pay the costs of the litigation) as to benefit on 
the receiving end of those suits. Further, the law of the 10b-5 claim has lost any coherent 
connection to the traditional tort-based compensation rationale, and more generally, the case law 
has made a hash of the 10b-5 jurisprudence.10 
This article develops a better theoretical understanding of these issues. In Part I we focus 
on the Rule 10b-5 cause of action and its foundation in common law fraud. The 10b-5 claim is 
ripe for confusion. Its fraud base means there are as many as eight elements the plaintiff must 
separately prove to prevail and an equal number of places where the defendant can mount an 
attack.11 A judicial tendency to conflate the elements and their proof—for example, materiality 
with reliance or reliance with loss causation—exacerbates the mess.12 Further, the interaction of 
two key temporal dimensions of the 10b-5 claim adds to the complexity: 
(1) The front end and back end of litigation (i.e. matters to be addressed at pre-
trial motions versus those left to trial). Congress has chosen to move judicial 
review forward for some, but not all, of the elements that make up a Rule 10b-5 
claim so that parties have ample incentive to characterize their claims to fit the 
procedural setting most favorable to their case. 
(2) The front end and back end of a fraud. The nature of fraud is that there 
seemingly is a temporal division between when defendant’s misrepresentation and 
plaintiff’s reliance on it occur and when plaintiff’s injury is ordinarily realized 
                                                 
8 Basic, 485 U.S. at 246-47.  
9 See infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra Part IV below. 
11 See infra Part I below for a discussion of the common law elements of fraud. 
12 See e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1212 (2013) (Thomas J., 
dissenting) (arguing the Amgen majority conflated the doctrinally independent elements of materiality and 
reliance); Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(conflating loss causation with reliance). 
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and measureable. This line turns out to be less real in a class action context, but 
has been subject to recurring battles in the class certification setting.13 
As to the first, defendants’ natural inclination is to push issues forward to the earlier stages of 
litigation, where procedure reigns over substance.14 In three cases before the Supreme Court 
since 2011, defendants sought to require the plaintiffs to prove three of the substantive elements 
of the 10b-5 cause of action—materiality, reliance, and loss causation—as a condition to class 
certification.15 The defense bar has pressed the Court to accept that elements that might 
otherwise be subject to proof only at trial, should be proved earlier in the litigation and, thereby, 
prevent a trial. The defendants came up short in each case, but those cases shifted the judicial 
focus to yet another issue: price impact. Defendants are now using the price-impact element to 
contest reliance during the class certification phase. We explore that debate later in the article, by 
examining its place in the larger theoretical debate about securities class actions.16 We also 
                                                 
13 Jill Fisch has very effectively addressed the temporal confusion between ex ante price distortion and 
ex post price impact in Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 
WASH. U. L. REV. 895, 899, 921, 924 (2013). Don Langevoort likewise has pointed to the conflation of 
reliance and loss causation. Donald C. Langevoort, Judgment Day for Fraud on the Market: Reflections 
on Amgen and the Second Coming of Halliburton, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 37 (2015). 
14 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), permits defendants to bring a motion 
to dismiss as to scienter and misrepresentation prior to any discovery, increasing opportunities for 
defendants to take advantage of the procedural settings at the front end of litigation. Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 747. One study showed almost 40% of 
cases are dismissed at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Michael Klausner, Jason Hegland & Matthew 
Goforth., When Are Securities Class Actions Dismissed, When Do They Settle, and for How Much?—An 
Update 1, 3, (PLUS Journal, April 2013; Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 445; 
Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No, 145), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2260831 (study of all securities class actions filed between 2006 and 2010 
showed “38% of cases ended relatively quickly and painlessly for the defendants”). Yet, cases that do 
survive the motion to dismiss have higher settlement value, thus increasing the pressure on defendants to 
settle the case or, alternatively, increasing their incentive to find another way to eliminate the case 
procedurally prior to discovery or trial. Id.   
15 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (loss causation); 
Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013) (materiality); Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (reliance). 
16 Price impact is not yet well understood, and the confusion is due, at least in part, to the confusion 
surrounding the second temporal dimension—the difference between the front and back end of fraud. In 
short, the defendants’ misrepresentation and plaintiffs’ reliance on it would typically occur at Time 1, or 
at the beginning of the class period, but the plaintiffs’ injury is typically realized and usually measured 
with regard to facts available later, at, for example, Time 2, after the fraud is revealed. It is, in fact, 
endemic to fraud that investors do not know about it at the front end. As the Supreme Court pointed out in 
Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, at the time of the purchase or sale, the investor has not yet sustained an 
economic loss that would give rise to recovery, nor can damages be effectively measured. Dura Pharms., 
Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342-43 (2005).  
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discuss another key element of the class action, reliance, which is very different in open-market, 
anonymous transactions than in traditional face-to-face encounters.17  
In Part II, we explore the arguments and tensions surrounding the use of the class action 
to pursue open-market transaction claims and how the securities version of fraud has necessarily 
developed differently from its common law cousin. In Part III, we trace the key recent Supreme 
Court decisions that have produced the emerging jurisprudence on class actions more generally 
and on price impact in particular. These cases, when read together, reveal how the focus on the 
“science” of market efficiency, combined with a ratcheting up in procedural battles, has created 
layers of litigation that are both muddled and problematic. The result is a diminished and 
impoverished understanding of the substance of fraud, which harms both investors and corporate 
decision makers, who often have to make reporting decisions in rapid fashion.  
Part IV turns to the theoretical understanding of securities class actions more generally, 
expanding the discussion from investor-based justifications to a view of the class action as part 
of the larger securities regulatory impulse. To do so, we expand the discussion of the goals of 
securities regulation to include those that are focused on creating strong, healthy markets that 
enable capital allocation, growth, and innovation. These goals, along with those focused on 
systemic risk and stability, are a part of the securities regulatory structure that has its home in 
publicness, the space outside of the private focus on transactions between sellers and purchasers 
that takes in the broader effect on citizens at large. Publicness in the more general sense reflects 
what society demands of powerful institutions, in terms of transparency, accountability, and 
openness, in order for that power to be legitimate.18 The specific application here encompasses 
the idea that over time, the motivations for securities regulation have expanded well beyond 
individual investors and their relationship to the financial markets to include the impact of those 
                                                 
17 Two traditional elements of common law fraud—reliance and loss causation—correspond to these 
two time periods. Reliance (transaction causation or but for causation) focuses on the connection between 
the plaintiff’s harm and the defendant’s wrongful conduct at Time 1. There cannot be a cause of action, 
even for a misrepresentation that is material and made with the requisite mental state, if there is not a 
sufficient connection to the plaintiff’s harm. A traditional phrasing would sound something like this, “I 
heard your misrepresentation and in response changed my conduct.” List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 
457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965) (asking whether “plaintiff would have been influenced to act differently than he 
did act if the defendant had disclosed to him the undisclosed fact”). In contrast, loss causation describes 
the connection at the back end, after the fraud is revealed. A plaintiff, who has relied on the defendant’s 
wrongful conduct, cannot recover unless the loss is properly attributed to the fraud. This loss-causation 
link addresses the fact that in open-market securities-fraud cases, the question has been how to sort out 
the change in value properly attributed to the fraud from the changes due to other, often constant, market 
price changes. 
18 We and others have discussed the term “publicness.” See Hillary A. Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy 
of Corporate Publicness, Pomerantz Lecture, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1629 (2014); Donald C. Langevoort & 
Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. 
L.J. 337 (2013); Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1012 (2013); Hillary A. 
Sale, The New “Public” Corporation, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137 (2011); see also Joan M. 
Heminway & Shelden R. Hoffman, Proceed at Your Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 
78 TENN. L. REV. 879 (2011).  
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markets on society and citizens more broadly.19 Congress and the Supreme Court recognize class 
actions as an accepted part of American securities regulation, and we argue that publicness and 
the market and citizen focused goals of securities regulation support that recognition. As a result, 
we argue, securities fraud class actions are necessarily different from traditional common law 
fraud and will have correspondingly different risks of, for example, overcompensation.20 
In this Part, we identify a third temporal dimension that is important to our argument—
the front end and back end of the regulation of securities. The front end is the familiar disclosure 
regime that is the recurring focus of American securities regulation and the back end is the 
antifraud enforcement that Rule 10b-5 provides. Market efficiency and intermediation play a role 
in both facilitating securities offerings and enabling the class action that helps support the 
deterrence and enforcement necessary to create strong and healthy markets. This is the space in 
which securities regulation and market intermediation meet publicness and where the scope of 
the traditional theory of class actions necessarily expands. Interestingly, however, the result is 
that the space for arguing about reliance then contracts. We illustrate this result by applying this 
publicness-based theory to the price-impact, class-certification context. We conclude that the 
resulting contraction reflects both the role of market intermediation in securities litigation that is 
consistent with its role in the front end of securities regulation, as well as the importance of 
securities fraud enforcement to the broader, publicness goals of market protection, innovation, 
growth, and stability and systemic risk.  
I. THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10B-5 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission have been the source of considerable academic 
commentary over the years. Although at one point there was a fight about whether the courts 
could “disimply” the private cause of action that had been implied by courts, Congressional 
action in 1995 retained it, adding procedural hurdles to cabin its use in contexts seen as 
                                                 
19 We develop publicness in this article both in the context of market efficiency as well as the deterrence 
effect of class actions. What we used to view as a form of “private” regulation is in fact increasingly 
public in nature. Publicness impacts regulatory decisions as well as those of corporate actors who, as a 
result of publicness, are subject to heightened accountability. The impact of corporate decisions on the 
markets resulting, for example, in the 2009 financial crisis, increases pressure on legislatures, regulators, 
and others to address, through the regulatory structure, the potential for further market shocks and 
recessions. In addition, in the context of securities litigation, publicness means that choices by corporate 
actors about what and how they communicate do not stop at the corporate door. 
20 Both Congress and the Court have addressed this risk, for example, by permitting rebuttal to the 
presumption of reliance in Basic and by developing multiple requirements for securities fraud class 
actions through the PSLRA. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
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worrisome.21 Nevertheless, the 10b-5 cause of action and the cost of litigating it remain 
controversial.22  
Rule 10b-5 claims have multiple elements, almost all with roots in the common law. In 
the end, if a case goes to trial (and very few do), the Supreme Court has provided the following 
list of elements that the plaintiffs must prove: 
1. a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant(s); 
2. scienter; 
3. a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase 
or sale of a security; 
4. reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; 
5. economic loss; and  
6. loss causation.23 
The Supreme Court’s list, not surprisingly, reflects the long-standing elements of 
common law fraud; the black letter elements of the tort of deceit are basically the same. Private 
recovery for deceit can occur if there is:  
1. a defendant’s misrepresentation of 
2. a material  
3. fact  
4. done with scienter  
5. on which plaintiff relies  
6. suffering damages as a consequence.24  
Indeed the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the securities statutes explicitly draw on 
common law, sometimes phrasing it as expanding on common law fraud and other times 
adapting the common law fraud.25  
                                                 
21 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737. 
22 Fisch, supra note 13.  
23 This list originates in Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo in 2005, and in a somewhat shortened form 
appears in Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. in 2008, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. 
Siracusano in 2011, Halliburton I in 2011, Amgen in 2013, and Halliburton II in 2014. See e.g., Dura 
Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005); Stoneridge Inv. Partners LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, (2011); Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2184 (2011); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. 
Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John, Fund, Inc. 
(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2418 n.1 (2014). 
24 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 685-86 (4th Ed. 1971) at 685. This source does not break out 
materiality in a separate heading, but discusses it within misrepresentation. Id. at 695. 
25 Compare Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341 (“resembles, but is not identical” to the common law) with 
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating “an important purpose of the 
federal securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law protections 
by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.”) See also Basic, 485 U.S. at 244 
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Rule 10b-5’s language, as promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
1942, included the first three specific elements from common law fraud—misrepresentation of a 
material fact.26 The elements of scienter, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation were 
omitted—not surprising for a rule originally adopted in an afternoon to empower the government 
to go after fraudsters.27 When courts later decided that the same policy and rule would permit 
private causes of action, it was also not a surprise that they looked to common law fraud to fill 
out the requirements of scienter, reliance, and loss causation.28 Plaintiffs must prove all of the 
elements to recover. 
The Court’s list of the elements, which comes from a 2005 Supreme Court opinion, Dura 
Pharmaceuticals, has contributed to the confusion around these claims.29 For example, it 
combines two—materiality and misrepresentation—that common law and prior Supreme Court 
opinions have recognized as separate.30 There are many material facts that shareholders would 
want to know, but unless the corporation or a person associated with it has an obligation to 
disclose information, the failure to do so is not a misrepresentation (by omission) and, therefore, 
no 10b-5 claim arises.31 The list also omits entirely the requirement that the material 
misrepresentation be as to a fact (as opposed to an opinion), a context that generated the Court’s 
most recent securities opinion.32 Further, the Court drops into the middle of its list of common 
                                                 
n.22 (1988) (Rule 10b-5 actions are “in part designed to add to the protections provided investors by the 
common law”). 
Section 11 of the 1933 Act is framed against this same template of the elements of common law 
fraud, but it relaxes the requirements for reliance, changes the burden of proof for loss causation, and does 
both for scienter. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. Section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act adopts a different combination of 
these same elements, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) and Section 18 of the 1934 Act provides yet a different 
combination that includes a double reliance requirement. 15 U.S.C. § 78r. 
26 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
27 Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 BUS. LAW. 891, 922 (1967). 
28 See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1946).  
29 Dura’s addition of economic loss to the list has also been criticized as not following from common-
law deceit precedents. John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Fraud-on-the-Market Tort, 66 
VAND. L. REV. 1755, 1768, 1773 (2013) (damage understood as a prudential filter by which judges have 
excluded certain well-founded but trivial deceit claims; this requirement “dissipates (or, perhaps, 
disappears)” when plaintiff only seeks relief based on rescission or unjust enrichment; because courts 
have understood damages as a pragmatic filter, they have not insisted on the exacting conception of 
economic loss invoked by Dura). 
30 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 239 n.17 (distinguishing materiality—addressed in that case—from duty to 
disclose, an element of misrepresentation). 
31 Gallagher v. Abbott Labs., 269 F.3d 806, 808 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We do not have a system of 
continuous disclosure. Instead firms are entitled to keep silent (about good news as well as bad news) 
unless positive law creates a duty to disclose.”).  
32 Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1321-22 (2015) 
(distinguishing opinion from facts that can be misleading in the context of a section 11 (not Rule 10b-5), 
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law fraud elements the requirement that the misrepresentation be in connection with the purchase 
or sale of a security.33 These words, drawn from similar language in the Securities Act, reflect 
the New Deal desire to provide a federal claim for common law fraud cases occurring in 
securities markets for which state law had proven inadequate.34  
As our first step in clarifying the 10b-5 cause of action and aspects of its proof, then, we 
suggest that the Court’s framework in Dura causes unnecessary confusion. Rather than 
continuing to rely on the Dura list, we propose a reframing of the elements organized around:  
1. the defendants’ prohibited conduct;  
2. the plaintiffs’ harm;  
3. the connection between the conduct and the harm; and  
4. the link to a securities transaction. 
The two elements that make up the requisite “connection” are core to this article, and both are 
sometimes denoted as causation. The reliance element provides a front-end link between the 
plaintiffs’ purchase or sale and the defendants’ prohibited conduct (Time 1). Reliance is 
sometimes referred to as transaction, or but-for, causation. Loss causation, however, refers to a 
different connection usually measured at the back-end and sorts out losses that can be attributed 
to the fraud from those that can be allocated to another source (Time 2). This element addresses 
the concern that market prices can move in response to factors other than the alleged 
misstatement or omission. For example, the market price of an individual security can fall in 
response to an overall decline in the market. Loss causation responds to the legal and policy 
concerns that the plaintiffs should not be insured against market changes.35 This element plays 
the intervening or proximate cause role that the Palsgraf case plays in traditional tort cases.36 
Yet, in securities fraud cases, the change in market price normally shows up after the fraud has 
been revealed; thus, loss causation seeks to disaggregate the loss, or to separate out the portion 
due to the fraud. Reliance and loss causation are, therefore, different from each other and, 
because of market intermediation, different in an open-market securities setting from that of the 
traditional common law fraud claim.  
                                                 
but finding that statement of opinion qualifies as misleading statement if opinion expressed was not 
sincerely believed).  
33 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 341. 
34 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22 § 12, 48 Stat. 74 (1933). 
35 See Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 
151, 181-84 (2009) (discussing the Dura Court’s analysis of loss causation); See also Jill E. Fisch, Cause 
for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud, 94 IOWA L. REV. 811 (2009) (discussing the Dura 
Court’s analysis of loss causation). 
36 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). 
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Table 1:  Elements of Common Law Fraud in 10b-5 
Common Law Elements 
Relating to Defendant’s 
Conduct 
Common Law 
Elements Relating to 
Plaintiff 
Common Law Elements Defining 
Connection Between Defendants’ 
Wrongful Act & Plaintiffs’ Loss 
Necessary 
Connection to 
Securities 
1. Misrepresentation 
(includes a. affirmative lies; b. 
half-truths; or c. silence if there 
is a duty to speak) 
5. Plaintiff suffers harm 
(economic loss) 
6. Reliance (by plaintiff on 
defendant’s wrongful act, 
sometimes discussed as “transaction 
causation” or “but for” or “causation 
in fact”) 
8. In connection with 
the purchase or sale of 
a security 
1. 2. of a material  7. Loss causation (sometimes 
discussed as proximate cause, and 
distinguishing loss from the fraud 
from loss from other sources such as 
the market) 
 
2. 3. fact    
3. 4. done with scienter (a 
sufficiently bad mental state) 
   
 
II. SECURITIES FRAUD CLASS ACTIONS  
Securities fraud cases are different from the traditional common law fraud case. Modern 
securities transactions often occur in public markets, not in face-to-face transactions. The 
common characteristics of markets and transactions mean that individual suits for fraud arising 
in this setting make little economic sense. Thus, securities fraud cases usually occur as class 
actions, creating a different litigation context and the need for a different understanding of some 
of the elements, including, for example, reliance and damages.37  
A. Class Actions as a Response to the Economics of Individual Shareholders 
Securities fraud litigation occurs largely in the class action context, and the cases support 
an industry for both plaintiff and defense side lawyers.38 The class action mechanism addresses 
two key issues for open-market securities fraud claims arising in modern public corporations. 
The first is that the costs of litigating an individual securities fraud claim exceed the holdings of 
most individual investors39 Portfolio theory and investment patterns reveal that shares are 
dispersed among numerous shareholders each owning a small percentage of a company’s stock. 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
38 See Lynn A. Baker et al., Setting Attorneys’ Fees in Securities Class Actions: An Empirical 
Assessment, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1677 (2013). 
39 See id. at 1679.  
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Indeed, most investors do not hold a significant number of shares in any given company.40 As a 
result, the cost of hiring a lawyer to pursue a fraud claim will likely quickly surpass the value of 
the typical individual stake in a public company so that it is not worth an individual’s while to 
pay the costs of litigating a claim. In economic terms, these small investors have a collective 
action problem. Their losses are too small to support litigation unless they join as a group or 
class.  
B. Class Actions and Litigation Agency Costs 
In addition to low incentives to sue due to the size of their claims, investors also have low 
incentives to monitor the class action litigation that may be brought on their behalf.41 As a result, 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers play a very significant role in these cases. They do the cases on 
contingency and manage the litigation—in consultation with representative plaintiffs. Because of 
the contingency aspect, the lawyers also assume the risk of any loss, including the cost of cases 
that do not result in settlement.42 When these cases do settle, there are often substantial fees to 
the lawyers and, when spread across the class, relatively small recoveries for individual 
plaintiffs. Opponents argue that many of these cases amount to little more than strike suits.43 The 
litigation is frequently described as vexatious.44 Others have argued that the plaintiffs’ bar brings 
cases simply to extract unwarranted settlements and that the cases can harm the reputation of the 
defendants, resulting, in the view of the opponents, in high opportunity and transaction costs 
from the litigation.45  Some claims are difficult to sort out46 and, whether the fraud occurred or 
not, litigation takes time away from executives running the business. 
Proponents of private class actions, however, argue that the cases are key to deterrence 
and, therefore, enforcement of the securities regulations and that they support the scarce 
resources of the Securities and Exchange Commission.47 In this view, plaintiffs’ lawyers act as 
private attorneys general, enforcing the fraud prohibitions and, thereby, promoting the goals of 
fair and efficient markets that, as we explore in Part IV, are tied to publicness, innovation, 
growth and stability. This private attorneys general view is particularly important when 
                                                 
40 Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform: Lessons from Securities Litigation, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 533, 536 n.21 
(1997). 
41 Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 1747 (2004) (discussing litigation agency costs). 
42 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 40 at 554. 
43 Brief for Petitioner at 42-43, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 
13-317). 
44 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 739 (1975). 
45 Eric Helland, Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation, 49 J.L. & 
ECON. 365, 375-78 (2006). 
46 Id. at 742 (noting that oral claims in securities cases can be hard to sort out). 
47 William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why It Matters, 57 VAND. L. 
REV., 2129-50 (2004). 
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considered in light of the relatively small holdings of the average plaintiff and the resulting lack 
of incentive for a small investor to bring the cases on his or her own.48 
C. The Role of Insurance 
The power of the litigation is increased by the fact that, for the defendants, the 
consequences of litigating and losing are very high. Defendants found liable for fraud lose their 
directors and officers insurance coverage and their indemnification.49 Further, the damages, 
which would be personal at that point, are potentially very large.50 This looming shadow of 
liability [at the back end] arguably adds to the [front-end] value of the claim and increases its 
strike and settlement value. For those reasons and many others, including the mixed incentives of 
both the defense and plaintiff-side lawyers, these cases rarely go to trial. Instead, they are 
resolved by settlement, after litigation focused on motions and procedural arguments, and with 
little attention to actual facts or evidence.51 Insurance policies cover the settlement costs, 
including fees for plaintiffs’ counsel, as well as paying the defense lawyer fees along the way. 
Thus, insurance policies, with their exclusions for fraud and bad faith, play a role in the incentive 
to settle and the amount of money available for settlement. 
D. Causation and Impersonal Market Transactions 
The common law of fraud requires each injured person to have relied on the misstatement 
or omission in order to prove her claim.52 Yet, in publicly held corporations the interactions 
supporting these fraud claims are trades in impersonal markets and thus are unlike the traditional 
relationship-based fraud of the common law fraud setting. The market acts as an intermediary. 
Further, class action rules that cover the typical securities litigation require that class member 
claims be sufficiently similar, addressed with a standard that focuses on whether questions of law 
                                                 
48 For a summary of the debates on these issues and a discussion of research on the topic, see Fisch, 
supra note 40. 
49 They also suffer reputational harm, though that harm may well be more perceived than actual. See 
Helland, supra note 45.  
50 See Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair Fund 
Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 372 (2015) (discussing the average recovery and aggregate damages 
in securities class actions). See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in 
Securities Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 611 (1985). 
51 See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency 
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 896 (1992) (noting that the potential for “substantial 
overcompensation” influences the parties’ “bargaining dynamics associated with pre-trial settlement.”); 
Janet C. Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 497 (1991). 
52 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014) (“To 
recover damages for violations of section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove . . . ‘reliance upon 
the misrepresentation or omission’. . . .”) (quoting Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013)). 
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or fact common to class members predominate over questions affecting individual members.53 
Combining the impersonal nature of the transaction with the class action, then, results in the need 
for adjusting the common law, and in particular, the reliance element.   
Consider the following example. If all investors were Warren Buffett, they would be able 
to prove their reliance on a defendant’s misstatement or omission, because they would read the 
company’s offering documents, quarterly, or annual reports. Those investors would be well 
informed and up to date on the company’s changes in management, product lines, and 
strategies—at least those that were made public.54  
Investors, however, trade for multiple reasons and with varying degrees of information. 
Indeed, unlike Warren Buffett, small investors are less likely to read all or any of a company’s 
filings.55 Their reliance is not directly on company documents or statements, but is, instead, 
indirectly on those filings as interpreted by analysts or brokers and others who translate the 
information to the market.56 As a result, an insistence on maintaining reliance as developed at 
common law would defeat the use of the class action and eliminate the enforcement it brings. It 
is for this reason that, in 1988, the Supreme Court recognized the fraud-on-the-market doctrine in 
the now famous case of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.57 In Basic, the Court defined the requisite 
connection between a defendant’s wrongful act and plaintiffs’ harm, noted that there is more 
than one way to demonstrate that connection, and decided that the 10b-5 version of fraud must 
account for the difference between modern securities markets transactions and their common 
law, face-to-face counterparts. Applying these principles, the Court held that as long as the 
securities trade in an efficient market, all investors—both Warren Buffett and the small 
investor—can be presumed to have relied on the market price as a reflection of the value of a 
share.58 This is where market intermediation comes into play. In short, the theory is that if the 
market is efficient, a term about which there is considerable debate, public information about the 
company will be impounded into the stock price. Thus, when an investor or that investor’s 
retirement fund buys the securities at the market price, the price reflects the information – true or 
false. The presumption is that public, material misrepresentations can distort the price of stock 
traded in an efficient market, and, as a result, purchasers in that market may be considered to 
                                                 
53 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
54 Of course, if all investors were like Warren Buffet, they would have relatively large holdings in 
companies, making it worth their while to sue. 
55 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
569 (1984). 
56 Id.  
57 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243-45 (1988) (“[O]ur understanding of Rule 10b-5’s reliance 
requirement must encompass [the differences between “modern securities markets, literally involving 
millions of shares changing hands daily” and “face-to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud 
cases] . . . . Requiring plaintiffs to show a speculative state of facts . . .would place an unnecessarily 
unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff who has traded on an impersonal market.”). 
58 Id. at 249-50. 
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have done so in reliance on the misrepresentation. To be sure, this form of reliance is only a 
presumption and is subject to rebuttal.59 
This theory of market efficiency, or market intermediation, acts as a proxy, so to speak, 
for reliance as traditionally required for face-to-face transactions. It was controversial when 
adopted in Basic, and has been debated ever since – both in the legal60 and the economic 
literature.61 Nevertheless, it provided the commonality necessary for class actions and, as we will 
explore in Part III, prompted a trio of recent Supreme Court cases, one of which affirmed both 
the presumption and its importance.  
A second element affected by the open-market setting is the calculation of damages. The 
usual method has been to use an event study, that measures the change in the price at the time of 
correction of the fraud, or Time 2, as a proxy for how much inflation occurred at the time of the 
misstatement, or Time 1.62 This delta is generally referred to as the price impact of the fraud, and 
much of what we know about its measure has occurred in the context of damage and loss 
causation measurement.  
In theory, the value of the fraud could be measureable at the front end—at the time 
defendant makes the misrepresentation and plaintiffs enter into the securities transaction. The 
goal would be to measure the out-of-pocket harm to the security holder, or the difference 
between the value the stock was represented to have and its actual value at the time of the 
transaction. But, that turns out to be somewhat difficult to measure. The price at the time of 
transactions is available, but if it incorporates the fraud, it does not reflect the security’s true 
value. Economists, therefore, have focused on data that is more cacheable as a proxy for that 
value, using information from the back end.63 They look at how much the price changed 
(dropped) when the fraud was revealed and use that as a measure for the value of the 
                                                 
59 Id. at 248-49 (giving three examples of when the presumption might be rebutted: (1) market makers 
are already privy to the information conveyed by the defendant; (2) if credible countervailing information 
enters the market and dissipates the effect of the fraud; (3) as to plaintiffs who would have sold without 
relying on the integrity of the market (i.e. if motivated by concerns unrelated to the fraud.) This 
combination of rationales applicable to all investors and only to one investor creates some conceptual 
problems that have plagued later efforts to coherently describe the theoretical basis for the presumption 
and its rebuttal. See infra text accompanying notes 149-169. 
60 See generally Fisch, supra note 13; Roberta S. Karmel, When Should Investor Reliance Be Presumed 
in Securities Class Actions? 63 BUS. LAW. 25 (2007). 
61 See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock Markets: A Behavioral Approach 
to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135 (2002); Frederick C. Dunbar & Dana Heller, Fraud on 
the Market Meets Behavioral Finance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 455, 457 (2006). 
62 See Merritt B. Fox, Halliburton II: It All Depends on what Defendants Need to Show to Establish 
Price Impact, 70 BUS. LAW. 437 (2015) (discussing event studies in securities litigation generally and in 
price impact contexts more specifically). 
63 Dunbar & Heller, supra note 61, at 508.  
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misrepresentation. 64 The event study methodology aids in separating the price change 
attributable to the fraud from any other source, including particularly from the usual changes that 
occur in public markets.65 This work is that of the loss causation element, which necessarily 
operates off of data at the Time 2 point to make a conclusion about damages for the Time 1 
fraud. Here is where the conflation between the two elements has occurred.66 As discussed 
below, it is hard to reconcile price impact in the context of reliance, or Time 1, with this Time 2 
approach.  
E. PSLRA Provisions to Regulate Class Actions  
The arguments surrounding the costs and benefits of securities class actions formed the 
basis of a strong push for reform of the litigation of these claims, culminating in the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA).67 The PSLRA contained a myriad of reforms 
to securities claims and litigation, most of which have played out procedurally and two of which 
provide the foundation for the most recent series of 10b-5 cases before the Supreme Court.68  
As noted above, scienter, or the defendants’ state of mind, is an element of a securities 
fraud claim. Prior to the PSLRA, several courts had used Rule 9(b) of the FRCP to require that 
Rule 10b-5 claims be subjected to heightened pleading requirements.69 As to scienter, the 
PSLRA requires that plaintiffs plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that 
the defendant acted with the required state of mind.70 This inquiry, of course, is very fact-based. 
As a result, although the standard is “uniform,” the outcomes will never be. Fights about this 
                                                 
64 See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F. 2d 1335, 1344 (9th Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J. concurring) 
(reasoning that out of pocket measure, but not rescission, could be the basis for class certification; 
describing how data between date of misrepresentation and date of corrective disclosure can be arranged 
on a “price line” and “value line” to measure the effect of defendant’s wrong conduct at the time of the 
misrepresentation and the times afterwards). 
65 See Fisch, supra note 13; see Esther Bruegger & Frederick C. Dunbar, Estimating Financial Fraud 
Damages with Response Coefficients, 35 J. CORP. L. 11, 12-13 (2009) (“The iconic status of the event 
study is due to what it replaced: expert opinion based on unsupported assertions about materiality and loss 
causation, and as inflation-per-share estimates drawn from little more than junk science.”); Langevoort, 
supra note 35, at 180 n.127 (“To some extent at least, doubts about efficiency also call into question the 
precision of the event study itself, which often makes efficiency-driven assumptions in drawing the 
baseline against which observed returns are measured.”). 
66 See Michael J. Kaufman, At a Loss: Congress, The Supreme Court and Causation Under the Federal 
Securities Laws, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 37-38 (2005).  
67 See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, n.57 (2000) and H.R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 104–369, at. 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.) (discussing the benefits and potential for abuse in securities 
class actions). 
68 See Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Halliburton Co. v. 
Erica P. John, Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2426 (2014).  
69 Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007). 
70 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (b)(2) (2006 ed. & Supp. V). While providing a heightened pleading standard, the 
statute did not identify the required state of mind, leaving that to be determined by the courts. 
MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
 
15 
standard, and how courts should implement it, were the first wave of procedural litigation under 
the PSLRA.71 
The PSLRA also added a provision that stays discovery pending the outcome of a motion 
to dismiss.72 This provision works in tandem with the heightened pleading standard for scienter 
(and also for the misrepresentation element) to push plaintiffs to develop facts prior to filing their 
complaints in order to survive the motion to dismiss and pursue their claims.73 With respect to 
the strike suit/vexatious litigation argument summarized above in Part II-B, these provisions also 
worked to decrease the settlement value of a complaint early in the litigation and gave 
defendants the opportunity to end potentially frivolous cases without having to sustain the costs 
of discovery.74 At the same time, a complaint that survives the motion to dismiss is one that has 
met a very stringent pleading standard and has done so without access to documents or other 
discovery. For these cases, the settlement price tag likely has increased. Defendants could choose 
to settle those cases and move on, and in the early days, some did just that.75 Increasingly, 
however, defendants have been deploying additional procedural litigation tactics at other pre-trial 
stages of the case.76 The goal here, like in employment and consumer fraud cases, is to prevent 
the case from going to trial through the use of the class-certification process. 
                                                 
71 See Adam C. Pritchard and Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to 
Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125 (2005). 
72 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (2006 ed. & Supp. V). 
73 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 81 (2006) (stating that in order “to 
curb . . . perceived abuses” in class actions, Congress “authorize[ed] a stay of discovery pending 
resolution of any motion to dismiss.”); see also SG Cowen Sec. Corp. v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of 
Cal., 189 F.3d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The ‘Stay of Discovery’ provision of the Act clearly 
contemplates that discovery should be permitted in securities class actions only after the court has 
sustained the legal sufficiency of the complaint.”) (citations omitted); Pension Trust Fund for Operating 
Eng’r v. Assisted Living Concepts, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 2d 913, 914 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (“The purpose of this 
stay is to allow the Court to evaluate plaintiffs' claims in security actions before the defendant is required 
to engage in extensive and expensive discovery.”); Avenue Capital Mgmt. II, LP v. Schaden, No. 14-CV-
02031-PAB-KLM, 2015 WL 758521, at *2 (D. Colo. Feb. 20, 2015) (“The legislative history of the 
PSLRA indicates that Congress enacted the discovery stay to prevent plaintiffs from filing securities class 
actions with the intent of using the discovery process to force a coercive settlement.”) (citations omitted); 
In re Diamond Foods, Inc., Sec. Litig., No. C 11-05386 WHA, 2012 WL 6000923, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 
30, 2012) (“[T]he consolidated complaint has sufficiently pled scienter and loss causation under the 
PSLRA . . . [t]he discovery stay is now lifted . . . .”). 
74 Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA's 
Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH U. L.Q. 537, 576-78 (1998). 
75 Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes during the 
First Decade after the PSLRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489, 1498-99 (2006). 
76 See Jonathan Dickey, Securities Litigation: A Practitioner's Guide (2006-2014) (a practical guide, 
including many procedural tactics, for defending securities class action suits). 
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F. Class Certification Procedures in Securities Class Actions 
To understand the growth in the procedural issues raised by the defense bar, it is 
necessary to review the typical litigation path for these cases. After the initial step of filing a 
complaint, the litigation of one of these cases begins with a motion to dismiss, subject to the 
heightened pleading standard. The plaintiffs’ lawyers must meet the defendants’ motion to 
dismiss with very strong facts to support their case. Additionally, as mentioned above, they must 
do so without the aid of discovery.  
After the motion to dismiss, the parties can settle or they can move on to discovery and 
trial. Increasingly, these cases face a second stage of procedural battles focused on class 
certification. Defendants have sought to bring a larger number of issues into the class 
certification stage, in an attempt to defeat certification, and, thereby, the case. In addition, during 
the class certification battle, the defendants have argued that discovery should be limited solely 
to issues related to class certification.77  
At this stage, the focus, given FRCP 23(b)(3), is whether common or individual issues 
predominate.78 The challenge has been to determine whether a particular fraud element of the 
claim is one that is key to predominance or whether, if not proved at trial, would result in the 
case failing for all plaintiffs alike. The defendants have fought aggressively at this stage arguing 
that the plaintiffs need to prove, not plead, materiality, reliance, and loss causation at class 
certification and before trial. In addition, defendants have argued that reliance as presumed by 
Basic should be proved, and not presumed, at class certification.79 
The Court has rejected almost all of these claims by defendants, but it has done so in 
ways that have prompted additional fights. Both Halliburton opinions are examples of the 
procedural nature of much of current litigation. The Halliburton defendants have now made two 
trips to the Supreme Court to argue about the various levels of proof required on two different 
elements of these claims.80 Both arguments involve the class certification stage, and the second 
round of litigation was prompted by the Court’s language in the first opinion.81 As a result, the 
                                                 
77 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(2014) (No. 13-317). 
78 Before Halliburton I, discovery began after the motion to dismiss, limited to class certification. While 
Halliburton II was pending, cases began to move into general discovery. 
79 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 35-37, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (No. 13-317); Halliburton II, 
134 S. Ct. at 2412. 
80 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (considering 
whether plaintiffs relying on the fraud-on-the-market theory to establish reliance were separately required 
to establish loss causation in order to obtain class certification); Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(considering whether defendants could rebut the Basic presumption with evidence of a lack of price 
impact at the class certification stage). 
81 See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187 (“Because we conclude the Court of Appeals erred by requiring 
EPJ Fund to prove loss causation at the certification stage, we need not, and do not, address any other 
question about Basic, its presumption, or how and when it may be rebutted.”). 
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case, which was filed in 2001, has not yet been tried or “proved,” and presumably, defense 
counsel have billed thousands of hours in litigation.82 
G. Class Actions and Theories about Securities Regulation 
Class actions have not only led to significant changes in the elements of the fraud but also 
have disrupted the traditional tort-based theories used to support Rule 10b-5 claims. In particular, 
class actions challenge the compensatory rationale often given for tort claims like securities 
fraud. In the usual securities fraud class action setting, shareholders who were deceived, and 
therefore paid too much or too little, sue to recover their loss from the deceiver. A compensatory 
theory easily supports such a claim in a 1933 Act setting where the wrongdoer (the issuer and 
those working with it) are on the other side of the transaction from the investor and gain what the 
investor lost. In the typical setting under the 1934 Act, however, the wrongdoer is the company 
or its management and usually neither buys nor sells shares as a counterparty to the investor. 
Rather, the company/insiders made the misleading statement, and the investor thereafter traded 
with a third party, who is not a defendant and gets to keep any gain.  
Tort law, of course, is amenable to making those who deceive pay for the harm even if 
they did not directly benefit, but in the corporate setting, the result is that the corporate treasury 
will pay directly or indirectly by indemnifying directors and officers or paying the insurance that 
funds the settlement. Thus, circularity arises as funds go from one shareholder pocket (or one set 
of shareholders) to another shareholder pocket (or a somewhat different set of shareholders) after 
a substantial amount has been subtracted for attorneys’ fees and other transaction costs. 
Consequently, the compensation justification for recovery loses much of its force.  
The other traditional justification for fraud recovery, deterrence, fares better than 
compensation, but triggers additional complications in the class action context. Although the 
individuals who make misleading corporate statements can be held personally liable, such that 
damages would likely be expected to deter their conduct, the reality is that payments from the 
company or its insurer diminish this direct form of deterrence/enforcement. Instead, the 
enforcement/deterrence justification is much more indirect—if companies pay it will make their 
officers and boards change their behavior, increase investor belief in the markets, and support the 
publicness goals of securities regulation. We return to these issues when we engage in the 
theoretical discussion of securities class actions, market intermediation, and publicness in Part 
IV. 
III. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SUPREME COURT SECURITIES JURISPRUDENCE: MATERIALITY, 
RELIANCE, LOSS CAUSATION AND PRICE IMPACT 
Four twenty-first century Supreme Court opinions are responsible for the current 
confusion over the use of price impact in proof of reliance and loss causation, and they share 
                                                 
82 The district court granted class certification for one corrective disclosure and denied class status for 
five others in July 2015, referring to the “long and winding history of the matter.” See Erica P. John Fund, 
Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02−CV−1152−M, 2015 WL 4522863 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015). 
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several common features.83 First, they illustrate narrow holdings that, like common law cases 
generally, decide only the immediate case, putting off the larger issue for another day. Each issue 
and case unfolds from, and is connected to, the prior case, such that one needs to read them 
together to understand the Court’s current approach to 10b-5 and price impact. Further, the 
narrow holdings—and the Court’s loose language as to questions such as price impact—gave 
defendants (who lost the cases) room to continue to litigate, including bringing the same case, 
Halliburton, back to the Court.  
Second, these cases illustrate the current focus of 10b-5 litigation on the class 
certification context. The Court has trimmed the scope of class certification arguments, holding 
that materiality and loss causation questions are not appropriate and that the presumption of 
reliance does apply. In the wake of those holdings attention has shifted to another dimension 
arising at class certification, the narrowly defined space for price impact left open by Halliburton 
II. Third, the cases reaffirm the foundation of Basic that class actions are a core part of securities 
regulation and, importantly, Basic’s conclusion that adaptations to the common law of reliance 
through market intermediation and the fraud-on-the-market presumption are necessary if class 
actions are to have the effective deterrence role the Court supports. 
A. The Four Cases 
Before delving into the four 10b-5 cases, a reminder about the front and back end of the 
claims is useful. As we noted earlier, common law fraud requires a sufficient connection between 
a defendant’s wrongful act and a plaintiff’s loss. The defendant’s misrepresentation occurs at 
Time 1, and the plaintiff’s injury typically is realized at Time 2, when the fraud is revealed. The 
focus of reliance is at Time 1, the time of the transaction: did the plaintiff change his or her 
position in response to the misrepresentation? In contrast, the focus of loss causation, given the 
reality of how proof of damages occurs in modern securities markets, is usually later, at Time 2, 
when the truth is revealed. Demonstrating loss causation requires parsing the loss into the portion 
that can be attributed to the fraud and the portion allocated to other causes. In securities markets, 
where prices change regularly, that question is constant and complicated. The recent Supreme 
Court cases illustrate different aspects of the relationship of these two factors. 
1. Dura Pharmaceuticals: Pleading Front End (Time 1) Facts Does Not Meet the 
Standard for Pleading Loss at the Back End (Time 2). 
We begin with Dura Pharmaceuticals,84 a case decided a few years before the three class 
certification cases, and one that turned on the two distinct temporal dimensions inherent in fraud 
cases: Time 1, when the misrepresentation and reliance occur, and Time 2, when the truth is 
revealed and the effect of the fraud is actually felt. In Dura, the Supreme Court addressed the 
economic loss and loss causation elements in the context of a motion to dismiss.85  Put 
succinctly, the issue in the case was loss at Time 2, and plaintiff’s complaint addressed facts only 
                                                 
83 See generally Fisch, supra note 13. 
84 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
85 Id. at 336, 346. 
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for Time 1. The plaintiff pleaded price inflation due to the fraud.86 Necessarily, in any successful 
fraud case price distortion occurs.87 That is what fraud does. There is not, however, always an 
injury, and a plaintiff must also show harm (loss) that can be attributed to the fraud as opposed to 
another cause. Harm and loss, however, are visible only later, at Time 2. 
For contextual purposes, the allegations in Dura were that the defendants had made 
misstatements about earnings and about expected FDA approval of an asthmatic spray device 
that was not approved.88 There was evidence of loss causation for the earnings claim, but that 
claim failed the scienter-pleading standard at the motion to dismiss, leaving only the FDA 
claim.89 Without getting into the facts of Dura in detail, the price movement of the stock was less 
than ideal for the plaintiffs’ purposes.90 With respect to the loss causation element, the plaintiffs 
alleged the following: “[i]n reliance on the integrity of the market, [the plaintiffs] . . . paid 
artificially inflated prices for Dura securities” and the plaintiffs suffered “damage[s] thereby.”91  
The defendants argued that this allegation was insufficient for the loss causation element, 
which requires a causal connection between the defendants’ alleged misrepresentations and the 
plaintiffs’ economic losses.92 After noting that the standard to be applied to the pleading of this 
element was that of FRCP 8(a)(2), a “short and plain statement” of the facts, the Court held that 
the complaint did not meet the test.93 Instead, the Court held that the plaintiffs needed to claim a 
connection between the misstatement or omission and their injury.94 In doing so, the Court 
pointed out that by definition, if the defendants are committing fraud, the harm does not occur at 
                                                 
86 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 at 73, In re Dura Pharms, Inc. Sec. Litig. No. 399-CV-00151-L(WMC), 2006 WL 3267513 (S.D. 
Cal. 2006). 
87 Usually this would be inflation of value, but sometimes, as in Basic, the effect can be to lower the 
value of the stock, harming investors who sell at a deflated price. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 
227-29 (1988). 
88 Plaintiffs’ Fourth Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 at 32 and at 17-18, In re Dura Pharms, Inc. Sec. Litig. No. 99-CV-0151-L(WMC), 2006 WL 
3267513 (S.D. Cal. 2006). 
89 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 340 (describing the trial court’s dismissal of the drug-profitability claim 
because plaintiff had not adequately pleaded scienter).  
90 There was a noticeable drop after disclosure of new earnings and ambiguous results after disclosures 
about the FDA action—but the lower court had disposed of the earnings claims on scienter grounds. 
91 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 339-40. 
92 Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
Plaintiffs’ Consolidated and Amended Complaint at 20, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. Litig. No., 1999 
WL 33998677, at *1. 
93 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 346. 
94 Id. at 346-47.   
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the point at which the plaintiffs buy the stock.95 At that point, Time 1, although the market price 
is presumably inflated or sustained by the fraud, the harm has not yet occurred.  It occurs later, at 
Time 2, when the fraud is revealed, and the shares lose their value. Thus, the plaintiffs needed to 
provide information about where the loss and harm occurred, subject to the Rule 8 “short and 
plain statement” pleading standard. 
In reaching the holding, the Court set out the two bookend concerns characteristic of its 
current approach to Rule 10b-5: the importance of the cause of action in “maintain[ing] public 
confidence in the marketplace . . . by deterring fraud, in part through the availability of private 
securities fraud actions”96 and the potential for vexatious litigation in the modern class action 
setting.97 The Court focused on two settings in which plaintiffs would be able to show inflation 
at Time 1 but should not be entitled to a recovery.98 The first is if there is a misrepresentation 
about the securities, which, for example, inflates their price above their true worth, but plaintiff 
sells while the misrepresentation remains alive in the market and is not harmed. Here, there 
would be misrepresentation, but no loss (yet). Second, the Court identified the context in which 
there is misrepresentation and loss to the plaintiff, but the loss can be said to arise from a source 
other than the fraud.   
The first is a familiar problem addressed, for example, in the language of Section 11 of 
the 1933 Act.99 The second is the traditional space for loss-causation both in common law fraud 
and in securities market cases.100 The Court’s holding is straightforward and noncontroversial, 
illustrating the difference in the front and back end of 10b-5 cases and the procedural context that 
frames current litigation.101 In the end, the Court’s holding had a limited effect. On remand, with 
                                                 
95 Id. at 342. 
96 Id. at 345 citing Randall v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 664 (1986). 
97 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347-8. Here the Court echoes Blue Chip Stamps and the dissenters in 
Basic. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224 (1988) (White, J. dissenting). See Sale, supra note 74, at 552-68 (discussing Congress’s reform 
movement to curb vexatious litigation). See generally Stephen J. Choi & Robert B. Thompson, Securities 
Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes during the First Decade After the PLSRA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1489 
(2006) (same). 
98 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 336, 342.  
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(2) (2012) (permitting recovery by any person acquiring a security for which a 
registration statement contains an untrue statement of material fact, but recovery limited to difference 
between the amount paid and the price at which the price received in the market before suit if the price 
remains inflated at the time of the sale, that purchaser will have suffered no economic loss). See 
generally, Hillary A. Sale, Disappearing Without a Trace: Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Securities 
Act, 75 WASH. L. REV. 429 (2000). 
100 Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 343. See generally supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
101 But see the Court’s inclusion of a quotation from Justice White’s dissent in Basic using a “Cf.” signal 
to suggest an analogous example of investor insurance if allowing recovery in the face of affirmative 
evidence of nonreliance that blurs the lines between reliance and loss causation somewhat. Dura Pharms., 
544 U.S. at 345. 
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the pleading on the loss-causation element adjusted from Time 1 to Time 2, the complaint 
survived a motion to dismiss.102  
2. Halliburton I: Proof of Loss Causation Is Not Required to Show Reliance at 
Time 1 or for Class Certification  
Next in the line of evolution is Halliburton I,103 a case that also revolved around loss 
causation. Here, the focus had shifted from pleading loss causation, which turned out to be quite 
easy in light of Dura, to whether the plaintiffs had to prove loss causation at the class 
certification stage.104 Defeating a case at class certification is a win for defendants, because the 
matter will presumably disappear. Moreover, at that point, the insurance policy is still paying the 
defense lawyers’ fees, and a trial on the merits, with the concomitant discovery and spectacle of 
officers and directors on the stand, goes away.  
This case came to the Supreme Court from the 5th Circuit, which had earlier held that in 
order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance at class certification the plaintiff 
had to prove (not just plead) loss causation.105 The Supreme Court rejected this argument. 
Reflecting the learning of Dura about the role of the loss causation element as distinct from 
transaction causation/reliance, the Court held that loss causation’s focus on Time 2 has “no 
logical connection” to the facts necessary to establish the Basic presumption of reliance at Time 
1, when an investor decides to buy securities. Reliance and loss causation are separate elements 
and together mean, for example, that even if investors relied on a defendant’s misrepresentation 
at Time 1 to buy securities when the price was distorted by fraud, they cannot recover absent loss 
causation at Time 2. The Court was also clear that only the first question is relevant at class 
certification.106 
Halliburton I also reaffirmed the core learnings of Basic. First, reliance connects 
misrepresentations to injury. 107  Second, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate reliance in the same 
manner as in a traditional face-to-face fraud action would be impossible and would create an 
unnecessary and unrealistic evidentiary burden for open-market claims.108 Indeed, the 
requirement would block class actions. And, third, fraud on the market resolves the reliance 
                                                 
102 In re Dura Pharms., Inc., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (S.D. Cal. 2006). See also the subsequent litigation at 
548 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2008).  
103 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011). 
104 Brief for Petitioner at 2, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 
(2014) (No. 13-317). 
105 Oscar Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F. 3d 261 (5th Cir. 2007) (loss 
causation required to be proved for class certification). 
106 Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2186. This part of the opinion is simple enough and may reflect why the 
opinion was a unanimous, five page opinion with only one unnumbered footnote.  
107 Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2184. 
108 Id. at 2185.  
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concern and, in doing so, provides a path for recovery for fraud that helps to ensure public trust 
in the markets.109 The Court also reaffirmed Basic’s holding as to what the plaintiffs must show 
to gain the presumption of reliance. Here, the Court noted that plaintiffs have to demonstrate that 
the alleged misrepresentations were publicly known, that the market was efficient, and that the 
purchase or sale of stock occurred between the misrepresentations and the truth.110  
The Court refused, however, to take up the defendants’ efforts to characterize the opinion 
below as not about loss causation, but really about the conditions for gaining the presumption of 
reliance. Halliburton argued that the Court should require the plaintiffs to establish whether the 
alleged misrepresentations affected the market price in the first place, or whether the 
misrepresentations had a “price impact” on Halliburton’s stock.111 The Court rejected this 
characterization of the opinion below, as well as the conflation of the elements, and refused to 
reach for this issue, leaving the difficulty of proving reliance, or the lack there of, in the open-
market setting, for what turned out to be Halliburton II.112  
3. Amgen: Materiality Need Not Be Proved at Class Certification Before Basic Is 
Invoked  
In between Halliburton I and Halliburton II, defendants argued that plaintiffs must prove 
materiality at the class-certification stage in order to invoke the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption.113 The Court was no more open to this argument than the loss-causation one. This 
opinion, however, is substantially longer and more complex. It also generated three dissents and 
left space for additional litigation of the issues the Court did not decide. 
Materiality, like loss causation, is one of the elements of Rule 10b-5 fraud imported from 
the common law. Notably, neither of these elements is among the ones that Congress, in the 
PSLRA, decided to subject to the motion to dismiss and discovery stay.  In addition, materiality, 
unlike loss causation, is specifically mentioned in Basic as one of the prerequisites the plaintiff 
must show to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance (discussed in more detail 
in the next part). Defendants argued that because materiality was a predicate for the presumption 
of reliance, and without that presumption individual claims would dominate over common ones, 
plaintiffs should have to prove materiality at class certification.  
                                                 
109 Id.  
110 Id. Note that this listing of the preconditions leaves out materiality, an omission the Court in Amgen 
later reinserts without discussion. The list itself comes from footnote 27 of Basic where that court seems 
to be simply citing from the Court of Appeals opinion below. It is a very humble beginning for what turns 
out to be the determining issue of Halliburton II. See infra Part III B 
111 See Fisch, supra note 13. 
112 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John, Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2398 (2014). 
113 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013). 
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The Supreme Court held that although proof of materiality is required at trial or to prevail 
on the merits, it is not a prerequisite to class certification.114 The Court’s opinion is strongly 
rooted in procedure and more particularly in Rule 23(b)(3), which requires that common issues 
predominate to gain class certification.115 The Court first pointed out that Rule 23(b)(3) requires 
only a showing that the questions common to the class predominate, not that they are answered 
on the merits for the class.116 Then, the Court noted that materiality is an objective standard: it is 
a question common to all class members.117 Thus, if the plaintiffs were unable to prove 
materiality, they would fail to do so for all class members, not for individuals, and therefore, 
individual issues would not predominate on the question of materiality.118  Specifically, the 
Court reasoned, “[a]s to materiality, therefore, the class is entirely cohesive: It will prevail or fail 
in unison.”119 As a result, the Court concluded that Rule 23(b)(3) did not stand in the way of 
certification. Indeed, the role of 23(b)(3) is to determine only which method of adjudication is 
best and not to adjudicate the case in its entirety.120 
Three other aspects of the Court’s opinion are worth noting. First, the Court responded to 
Amgen’s policy argument that the failure to adopt its view would result in unwarranted 
settlement pressure. The Court emphasized that Congress dealt with this issue through the 
PSLRA and did not choose to require early proof of materiality (or loss causation). Instead, the 
Court stated that it had “no warrant to encumber securities fraud litigation by adopting a textual 
requirement of precertification proof of materiality that Congress, despite its extensive 
involvement in the securities field, has not sanctioned.”121 
Second, the Court rejected Amgen’s argument that proof of materiality at class 
certification would conserve judicial resources, stating that, in fact, “Amgen’s position … would 
waste judicial resources.” The Court’s point here is that increasing the focus on procedural 
resolutions of these claims complicates the litigation. Specifically, the Court noted that elevating 
proof of materiality (or loss causation) to the class certification stage would create more, not less, 
litigation, resulting in “a mini-trial at class certification … [that] would entail considerable 
expenditures of judicial time and resources, costs scarcely anticipated by Federal Rule of Civil 
                                                 
114 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191.  
115 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 
116 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191. 
117 Id.  
118 This is the classic test for 23(b)(3).  
119 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191. 
120 Id. See also Langevoort, supra note 13.  
121 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1202. 
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Procedure 23(c)(1)(A), which instructs that the decision whether to certify a class action be made 
‘at an early practicable time.’”122  
Finally, four justices dissented or concurred in Amgen raising a broader question that set 
the stage for Halliburton II. Justice Alito’s concurrence pointed out that the majority did not 
“revisit” Basic or the fraud-on-the-market presumption. 123 He then noted that recent evidence 
“suggest[ed]” that the market efficiency presumption might rest on a faulty economic premise,124 
referring to Justice Thomas’s dissent, which Justices Kennedy and Scalia, in part, joined. The 
four justices appeared to be calling for an opportunity to overturn Basic, and within months, the 
Court granted certiorari in Halliburton II.125 A holding in line with the four justices would 
effectively eliminate securities class actions, and, thus, raised heightened interest in the Court’s 
Halliburton II deliberations. 
4. Halliburton II: Affirming the Basic Presumption and Rejecting Proof, but 
Allowing Rebuttal, of Presumption at Class Certification  
Halliburton I and Amgen paved the way for a full-on assault on Basic and the fraud-on-
the-market presumption. They created the space for a robust challenge to the existence of 10b-5 
securities fraud class actions. Halliburton II posed the question about proving market efficiency 
at the class certification stage, but that was not the issue on most minds at the time the case was 
argued. Instead, the focus was on whether the Court would eliminate the fraud-on-the-market 
presumption altogether.126 
                                                 
122 Id. at 1201. The series of cases discussed here are proof of that issue. Dura was filed in 1999, went 
before the Supreme Court in 2005 and was resolved through settlement in 2009. Jocelyn Allison, $14M 
Settlement Reached in Dura Securities Suit, LAW 360 (Mar. 24, 2009), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/93418/14m-settlement-reached-in-dura-securities-suit. Amgen was filed 
in 2007, went before the Supreme Court in 2013 and remains unresolved as of 2015. Complaint for 
Violation of the Federal Securities Laws, Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, No. CV 07 
2536 PSG (PLAx), 2007 WL 4966000 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. at 
1204. Halliburton was filed in 2001, went before the Supreme Court in 2011 and 2014 and remains 
unresolved as of 2015. Class Action Complaint for Violation of Federal Securities Laws, Halliburton Co. 
v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. 
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
123 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1204 (2013). Note, however, that Justice Ginsburg’s majority opinion did state 
that Congress had rejected the opportunity to revisit market efficiency. 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 1206-15 (2013). This is an argument that the majority addressed and rebuffed, pointing out that 
Congress implicitly approved of the fraud-on-the-market presumption when it adopted the PSLRA. Id. at 
1200. 
126 Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Cases to Watch: Where Halliburton Might Make Its Mark, LAW 360 (June 
23, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/670778/cases-to-watch-where-halliburton-might-make-its-
mark.  
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The blockbuster possibility of Halliburton II failed to materialize. Chief Justice Roberts’s 
majority opinion reaffirmed the core holdings of Basic:127 the element of reliance provides a 
connection between a misstatement and a purchase or sale; the traditional common law form of 
reliance poses an unnecessarily unreasonable burden; and the rebuttable presumption of market 
reliance resolves the issue in an appropriate fashion for these anonymous transactions.128 The 
Court also rejected the defendants’ effort to require the plaintiff to prove price impact at class 
certification in order to invoke the presumption, noting that requirement would “effectively 
jettison half of the presumption.”129 Nevertheless, and in contravention of its expressed concern 
in Amgen about mini-trials, the Court held that the defendants were entitled to the opportunity at 
class certification to disprove market efficiency, referring to it as price impact, and creating 
confusion about the possible conflation of reliance, materiality, and loss causation.130 As a result, 
the term, price impact, defined, but unused in Halliburton I, and not used in Amgen, becomes the 
point of contest left open in Halliburton II.131 
Recall that before we detoured to Amgen, the Court had remanded Halliburton I, noting 
that any arguments properly preserved remained available to Halliburton.132 Thus, on remand, 
the defendants argued that class certification remained inappropriate. The core of their argument 
was that the evidence that they used to attempt to disprove loss causation revealed that the 
alleged misstatements did not impact the price of the stock.133 The lack of a price impact at Time 
2, they argued, rebutted the Time 1, Basic presumption, created a situation in which individual 
issues predominated over common ones, and defeated the use of the class action mechanism.134 
The District Court rejected that argument and held that the defendants could not defeat 
class certification by forcing the plaintiffs to prove (or allowing defendants to disprove) the 
reliance element before the merits stage.135 The Fifth Circuit, relying on Amgen, affirmed.136 
                                                 
127 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
128 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407-08, 2417. 
129 Id. at 2414 
130 Id. at 2417.  
131 See Fisch, supra note 13; Langevoort, supra note 13.  
132 Halliburton II, 131 S. Ct. at 2187. 
133 Defendants’ Brief Opposing Class Certification and, in the Alternative, Request to Supplement the 
Record at 1, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 
2012 WL 565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
134 Defendants’ Brief Opposing Class Certification and, in the Alternative, Request to Supplement the 
Record at 2-3, Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-
M, 2012 WL 565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
135 Archdiocese of Milwaukee Supporting Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2012 
WL 565997 (N.D. Tex. 2012). 
136 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 718 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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According to both courts, the defendants could use the price impact evidence at trial, where 
actual proof is required, but not at class certification.137 
The defendants again petitioned for, and gained a grant of certiorari from the Supreme 
Court.138 And, unlike in Amgen, when the Court pushed the defendants back to trial for 
materiality, the Court opened a window for yet another fight at class certification.139 To do so, 
the Court distinguished materiality from reliance, stating that materiality is “an objective issue 
susceptible to common, class wide proof.”140 All plaintiffs rise and fall together with a material 
or immaterial misstatement, defeating the claim on the merits. In contrast, the Court opined, 
price impact differs from materiality, because price impact is fundamental to Basic’s premise. “It 
thus has everything to do with the issue of predominance at the class certification stage … and 
must be proved before class certification.”141 Although the first part of the Court’s opinion 
affirmed the Basic reliance presumption and, thus, the class-action mechanism, the last part left 
space for the defendants to rebut the presumption – at the class certification stage and thus, 
before there is a trial or a jury.142 In reaching its holding, the Court focused on price impact, 143 
or more properly, the absence of price impact, as a term that it defined to provide the common 
link from Basic that would enable the reliance presumption.  
This review of the cases reveals that defendants’ dragnet for issues that can be decided at 
an early stage of litigation has reached almost every element of the traditional fraud claim, with 
materiality, reliance, and loss causation scrutinized for requirements about what the plaintiff 
must prove to invoke the presumption of Basic at class certification. We know from Halliburton 
I that loss causation is not on the list,144 and from Amgen that materiality is not either.145 
Halliburton II tells us that plaintiffs continue to be entitled to the presumption of reliance, but at 
the same time, the Court gives prominence to the term price impact and permits defendants to 
deploy it to rebut the presumption at class certification.146 
As a group, these three cases, along with Dura, all contain narrow holdings. Until 
Halliburton II, the Court avoided the big issue left open in Basic: rebuttal of the presumption. 
                                                 
137 Id. at 433.  
138 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014). 
139 See generally Langevoort, supra note 13.  
140 Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 2398.  
143 The term is used 22 times in two pages. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398. For example, the Court states 
that the “the first three prerequisites [of what must be shown to get the Basic presumption] are directed at 
price impact -- whether the alleged misrepresentation affected the market price in the first place.” This 
statement, of course, is aimed at Time 1. Id. at 2414.   
144 See supra notes 76-142 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 76-142 and accompanying text. 
146 See supra notes 129, 139-142 and accompanying text; see infra 161, 172-177 and accompanying text. 
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Although the Court recognized space for rebuttal in Halliburton II, we still do not know what 
proof of the requisite connection between an open-market purchase and a misrepresentation will 
look like. As a result, although Halliburton II narrowed the field of play, price impact, a largely 
undeveloped term, now has the potential to create confusion, complexity and mini-trials focused 
on econometric studies.147 Before turning to those concerns in Part IV, however, we first develop 
the growth of the term price impact and its meaning in relation to Time 1.  
B. The Growth of Price Impact. 
As Halliburton II makes clear, the term price impact is now on steroids, and, as a result, a 
more detailed understanding of its role and growth is necessary. The story has a humble 
beginning in the prerequisites for the presumption of reliance that first appear in a footnote to 
Basic. Price impact is not among the prerequisites listed. Instead, it merits only an indirect 
reference in the discussion of how the presumption might be rebutted. More than twenty years 
later Halliburton I and Amgen treat the presumption prerequisites cavalierly and their 
relationship to price impact even more so. In short, the Court ducks the hard question as to the 
requirements for the causal relationship between the defendants’ fraud and the plaintiffs’ trading 
loss in an open-market transaction. This section of the Article follows the Court’s stunted 
development of price impact in these cases. Then, in Part IV, we engage in the theoretical 
discussions about the securities class action, developing the goals of securities regulation in the 
context of publicness as well as the role of market efficiency/market intermediation in securities 
transactions and litigation. We then apply those constructs to the price-impact element. 
The starting point for the role of price impact is the discussion about the requirements 
necessary to establish Basic’s presumption of reliance, which the Halliburton II Court collapsed 
to price impact.148 Basic relegated this key issue to a footnote, and even there, it did little more 
than restate the view of the Court of Appeals.149 
The elements listed in footnote 27 are: 
1. That the defendant made public misrepresentations; 
2. That the misrepresentations were material; 
3. That the shares were traded on an efficient market; 
4. That the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying investor to 
misjudge the value of the shares; and 
5. That the plaintiff traded between the time the misrepresentations were 
made and the time the truth was revealed. 150 
                                                 
147 See Fisch, supra note 13; Langevoort, supra note 13; see also Pritchard & Sale, supra note 71.  
148 See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2416 (“Price impact is thus an essential precondition for any Rule 
10b-5 action”). 
149 Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 248 & n.27 (1988). 
150 Id.  
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The Supreme Court promptly cut that list from five to four, concluding that its holding as to 
materiality in an earlier part of the Basic opinion would collapse elements 2 and 4 into one.151  
Price impact is only mentioned later, when the Court addresses rebuttal of the reliance 
presumption. There, the Court refers to three disjunctive paths listed by the lower court, stating 
that the defendants could “rebut proof of the elements giving rise to the presumption, or show the 
misrepresentation in fact did not lead to the distortion of price, or that an individual plaintiff 
traded or would have traded despite his knowing the statement was false.”152 The Basic Court 
then concluded that “any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and 
either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price, 
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.”153  
The Court also provides three examples of potential rebuttals. The first is a situation in 
which market makers were privy to the truth about the merger discussions, and as a result, the 
market would not have been affected when the news became public.154 The second is when news 
of the merger credibly entered the market through another source and dissipated the effects of the 
misstatement.155 The third is when a plaintiff believed Basic’s statements were false, but sold 
because of unrelated concerns, e.g. potential antitrust problems.156 
We know from their correspondence that Justices Blackmun and Brennan (two of the 
four in the majority) engaged in a vigorous debate about the strength of the causal link required 
to show reliance in market transactions and particularly the conditions for this rebuttal. For 
Brennan even if there were reasons other than the fraud that the plaintiff’s traded, the reduced 
amount that plaintiff received is sufficiently connected to the defendant’s wrongful conduct as to 
permit recovery under 10b-5. 157 For Blackmun such a trader had been injured (the 
misrepresentation having led to a lower price than the investor would have received in a market 
with no fraud) but was not defrauded (i.e. the loss and the wrongful conduct were not sufficiently 
                                                 
151 Id.  Interestingly, the Court of Appeals had said that element 4 was the only one really at issue, but 
then found that it had been satisfied for pleading purposes. Levinson v. Basic Inc., 786 F.2d 741, 750-51 
(6th Cir. 1986). 
152 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) (quoting Levinson v. Basic Inc., 789 F.2d 750, n. 6 
(6th Cir. 1986)) (emphasis added). 
153 Basic, 458 U.S. at 248.  
154 Id.  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 See Letter from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun at 1 (Jan. 22, 1988) (on file with authors) 
(misstatement as cause in fact of injury given lower market price for the stock; necessary link between 
misrepresentation and injury has been shown without the need to show what Brennan called transactional 
reliance.) Professor Langevoort has earlier discussed this correspondence, concluding 10b-5 law would be 
clearer on this issue if Brennan’s views had prevailed. See Langevoort, supra note 13 at 49-50. That 
discussion and this is based on the correspondence at the Library of Congress first identified by Adam 
Pritchard. 
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connected).158 Both justices agreed that there was little practical difference in their two 
positions—which related only to the space available to the defendant to rebut the presumption of 
reliance that both justices agreed was appropriate in an open market setting, a rebuttal they 
believed would be very difficult or impractical for defendants. 159 Yet, this narrow, even esoteric, 
rebuttal space remained and gained new attention as discussed below when the Court reaffirmed 
Basic is 2014...  
Twenty-three years after Basic the Supreme Court elevated the elements necessary to 
gain the presumption of reliance from the Basic footnote to the text of the Halliburton I opinion, 
but inexplicably dropped materiality.160 Price impact was now expressly identified by the Court, 
albeit indirectly. Recall from the discussion in Part III, A above, that the Halliburton defendants 
argued the 5th Circuit had not really focused on loss causation (which the Supreme Court held 
was not a requirement to gain the presumption of reliance) but rather price impact (which the 
defendant argued should be a requirement to gain the presumption).161 The Court rejected that 
reading of what the 5th Circuit had done and then proceeded to define price impact, stating that, 
“Price impact simply refers to the effect of a misrepresentation on a stock price.”162 Next, the 
Court drew in reliance (an issue not before it), stating that: “if a misrepresentation [did] not 
affect the market price, an investor [could not] be said to have relied on a misrepresentation 
merely because he purchased at that price.”163 In short, this means that a price unaffected by 
fraud does not reflect fraud. Although the Court did not express a view on Halliburton’s 
argument, this rendition of the argument leaves room for price impact in the form of price 
support, or propping up a price, to be distinguished from moving the price up or down. Simply 
                                                 
158 See Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (January 25, 1988). Blackmun’s letter 
identified two reasons why the presumption did not apply, both of which are reflected in his opinion in 
Basic addressing rebuttal of the presumption: “If the material misrepresentation did not affect the price, 
then those who traded at market price were not affected by the misrepresentation.  Similarly, if there 
exists such a person who did not rely on the integrity of the market price to be accurate, that person was 
not defrauded by the misrepresentation (although he did receive less money for his shares than he would 
have received absent the misrepresentation).” Blackmun had made the same point in his first response to 
Brennan. See Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (January 15, 1988) (on file with 
author) (“the presumption of reliance depends on a link between the misrepresentation and the injury. If 
the defendant can prove that either the price would not have changed or that a particular plaintiff would 
have traded at the ‘incorrect’ price nonetheless, he should be entitled to rebut the presumption.”) 
159 Compare Letter from Harry Blackmun to William Brennan at 2 (January 15, 1988) (“not very 
useful…very burdensome to prove”) and Letter from William Brennan to Harry Blackmun (January 27, 
1988) (suspecting that defendant will find it impractical to use the rebuttal option).  
160 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011). Materiality 
was not at issue in that case, but nevertheless its omission is sloppy for the nation’s most prestigious 
court.  
161 Brief for Respondents at 10-12, Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2185 (No. 09-1403).   
162 Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187. 
163 Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. at 2187.  
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put, the fact that a price does not move does not mean that there was no price distortion or 
impact. Instead, the lack of movement may be price impact in the form of price maintenance. 
In Amgen, where materiality was at the core of the case, the Court did some backing and 
filling with respect to its omission of materiality in the Halliburton I list of requirements for the 
presumption of reliance. Amgen lists four elements as necessary to gain the presumption of 
reliance: (1) publicity; (2) materiality; (3) efficient market; and (4) trade timing.164 The fourth 
element, trade timing, or a requirement that the plaintiff trade between the time of the 
misrepresentation and the correction, is now described as an inquiry into adequacy of 
representation and is not tied to the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).165  
Of the remaining three elements, the Court finds one, materiality, cannot be contested at 
class certification. The Court’s rationale was that if materiality failed, it would prevent all 
plaintiffs from suing, and did not, therefore, “give rise to any prospect of individual questions 
overwhelming common [questions].”166 The other two, publicity and market efficiency, remain 
contestable at class certification.167 The Amgen Court did not specifically discuss materiality’s 
possible overlap with price impact except to say that “immaterial information, by definition, does 
not affect market price.” 168 
Finally, Halliburton II completes the movement of the predicates of Basic’s footnote 27 
to center stage. The fourth element, trade timing, is confirmed as within the zone of typicality 
and adequacy.169 Importantly, the Court took the first three predicates—publicity, materiality, 
and market efficiency—and presented them as price impact, previously defined in Halliburton 
I.170 Then, the Court gave them significant new importance when it stated that, “[i]n the absence 
of price impact, Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory and presumption of reliance collapse.”171 
Of course, given the holding in Amgen, the Court faced a situation in which it now put 
publicity, materiality, and market efficiency together as directed toward price impact, but had 
previously carved off materiality as unsuitable for class certification. The result is that the same 
                                                 
164 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1209 (2013). The incomplete listing 
in Halliburton I is passed over as a list that “includes” some of the elements. Id. 1198-99. 
165 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1198. 
166 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1199. In reaching this holding, the Court rejects both the idea that plaintiffs 
should have to prove materiality and that defendants can disprove it at class certification. Id. at 1198-99. 
167 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1198-99. 
168 Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1195. The Court noted that when “a market is generally efficient in 
incorporating publicly available information into a security’s market price, it is reasonable to presume 
that a particular public, material misrepresentation will be reflected in the security’s price.” Id. at 1192. 
169 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John, Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2408 (2014)  
170 Id. at 2414. 
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substantive inquiry bearing one label is pushed back to the merits, but with another label could 
be considered at class-certification. We return to this issue in Part IV. 
Finally, the Halliburton II Court also deployed an example of the role of price impact in 
determining market efficiency, and here is where the contradictions begin to grow. The Court 
posited a situation in which the defendants submitted event studies that examined the price of the 
stock in relation to six events.172 If one of the studies examined the alleged misrepresentation and 
revealed no price impact at Time 1, and the other five studies showed price impact, then the 
Court concluded that it would face a situation in which both the market was efficient and the 
misstatement alleged in the complaint had no price impact.173 The Court then pointed out that the 
result in that situation, absent the opportunity for the defendants to rebut the presumption, would 
be certification even though the “fraud-on-the-market-theory does not apply and common 
reliance thus cannot be presumed.”174  
The Court’s analysis is problematic unless it is reframed to include price stabilization. 
The Court’s discussion here and its prior discussion of price impact in Halliburton I do not 
directly address price stabilization. Yet, in the prototypical fraud case where, for example, 
misstatements continue a trend of positive news, the price impact can be price maintenance with 
little to no movement. That is the fact pattern in the Halliburton cases (and in Amgen and in 
Dura).175 Thus, to make sense of the Court’s use of price impact, we have to reconcile it with the 
Court’s failure to address price stabilization/maintenance and its role in most fraud cases. 
In sum, the Court’s development of the predicates for Basic’s presumption and its use of 
price impact as a proxy for those elements reveals a pattern of initial inattention and sloppiness 
about the elements of the presumption that then left space for litigants to make use of procedural 
mechanisms to plumb the intricacies of the presumption. Not surprisingly, that is what they are 
doing. Shortly after Halliburton II was decided, courts began to apply it, ruling that defendants 
could attempt to prove the lack of price impact at class certification. For example, Regions Bank 
won review of the issue in a case involving its merger with AmSouth Bancorp.176 Halliburton 
won a similar right, leading to subsequent class certification for one of the claims but not five 
                                                 
172 Id. at 2415. 
173 Id.  
174 Id. But see Alon Brav and J.B. Heaton, Event Studies in Securities Litigation: Low Power, 
Confounding Effects, and Bias, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (comparing the use of single-
firm event studies, and their weaknesses, as used in securities-fraud litigation with the multi-firm studies 
that academic research and peer-reviewed journals consider reliable). 
175 See note 274 and accompanying text. 
176 Local 703, Int’l Bhd of T., Grocery & Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 
1248 (11th Cir. 2014). On remand the trial court found no rebuttal of the presumption, 2014 WL 6661918 
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others.177 And, in the case of AIG, which had been stayed pending the outcome of Halliburton II, 
the company quickly agreed to a $960 million settlement in a case involving representations 
about credit default swaps.178  
The task of courts attempting to resolve these questions has been exacerbated by the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to explicate the reliance connection that is sufficient for open-market 
fraud relief in today’s public markets. Defendants continue to occupy the space created by this 
ambiguity by pushing for new issues to be decided at class certification, including, for example, 
an argument for requiring a showing of an effective measure of damages. Recently, a Texas 
federal court declined to certify a class, focusing on how an event study would incorporate 
various theories of liability.179 This opinion, along with the ones described in this Article, are 
examples of what Professor Don Langevoort has described as litigation taking the form of a 
repeat “game of whack-a-mole.”180 To make sense of this game then, an understanding of the 
theory of market regulation, as well as the theory of market efficiency and market intermediation 
and its role in class actions, is necessary. We turn there next.  
IV. MARKET INTERMEDIATION AND THE SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
The Court’s affirmance of Basic in Halliburton II makes clear that the securities class 
action as enabled by market efficiency is here to stay. Nevertheless, this area of the law still 
suffers from gaps and a missing set of guiding principles to unify our understanding of the 
securities class action. We develop those principles in this part of the Article. We begin by 
exploring the goals of securities regulation that are generally deployed in theoretical discussions 
of the securities class action—investor protection and corporate governance—and then add to 
those a set of additional goals that focus not only on investors but on the market and its stability 
more generally. These latter goals are in the publicness space about which each of the authors 
has previously written.181 We argue that publicness helps to explain the more robust goals of 
securities regulation as well as the role of the class action in enforcement and deterrence.  
Next, we develop the market’s role as an intermediary on both the front and back end of 
securities regulation. That role, it turns out, is important to understanding the evolution of the 
common law tort of fraud into today’s fraud-on-the-market based 10b-5 class action, as well as 
the specific issue of price impact. The market as intermediary and the correlative efficient market 
theory play an enabling role in the front-end, disclosure regulation space. As a result, market 
                                                 
177 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015 WL 4522863 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015) 
(granting class certification for one corrective disclosure and denying class status for five others). 
178 Noah Buhayar & Kelly Gilblom, AIG Agrees to Settle 2008 Securities Litigation for $960 Million, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Aug. 4, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-04/aig-agrees-
to-settle-2008-securities-litigation-for-960-million. 
179 In re BP PLC Sec. Litig., No. 4:10-md-2185, 2013 WL 6388408, at *17 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2013) (a 
pre-Halliburton II opinion finding that a non-securities Supreme Court case, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 
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180 Langevoort, supra note 13 at 45. 
181 See supra note 18.   
MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
 
33 
efficiency and market intermediation enable and facilitate both offerings and enforcement of 
securities regulation. We conclude, therefore, that because most securities transactions in public 
corporations now occur in open, anonymous, and increasingly sophisticated public markets, the 
regulatory and enforcement mechanisms have also evolved, and must continue to do so, to 
recognize the market as an intermediary in those processes. The result is a market intermediation 
substitute in both the regulatory and the enforcement/class-action contexts that encompasses 
publicness in order to support economic growth through strong markets and innovation. 
Finally, we turn to a specific discussion of the 10b-5 class action and the reliance 
element, developing a construct of the doctrine in the securities regulatory world where 
publicness plays a role. Here, we create an analytic framework for the 10b-5 tort’s evolution, 
again with particular attention to the role of market intermediation. We then deploy the construct 
of the market as intermediary in the more limited context of price impact, providing an example 
of how market intermediation and publicness can help to resolve questions in securities class 
actions. 
A. The Publicness of Securities Regulation and Enforcement 
We begin by adding to the theoretical work about the role of regulation and enforcement 
in the securities class action context. Many of our colleagues in the academy have explored 
securities regulatory goals and securities class actions, concluding that investor protection and 
corporate governance/agency cost arguments provide varying degrees of support (or lack of 
support) for a theory of these claims.182 Investor protection, of course, is an important aspect of 
the class action and is also a core securities regulatory concern more generally. Nevertheless, as 
the most recent market crash reveals, the system is larger than any one issuer, or set of investors, 
and the choices of issuers have serious and lasting impacts beyond just investors who invest in 
any one company. As a result, although we begin with investor protection and corporate 
governance and their place in the regulatory impulse, we expand the discussion to goals focused 
less on investor-specific concerns and more on developing strong and healthy markets and 
enabling innovation and growth. These goals are less about investors per se, and more about the 
larger society or publicness. The idea is that issuers both impact and are impacted by the market 
and forces outside those of the individual entity.183  
Publicness, we argue here, has become part of the securities regulatory impulse. As the 
extremely slow recovery and lagging economic growth after the 2008-2009 financial crisis have 
                                                 
182 See William Bratton & Michael Wachter, The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market, 160 U. PA. 
L. REV. 69 (2011); Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Litigation, 
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revealed, strong markets are key to innovation and growth. In the U.S. system, we have chosen a 
disclosure-based regulatory system to address the issues that might otherwise hinder the 
development of strong, healthy capital markets. Those regulations are generally on the front-
end—the offering side of securities transactions. They are complemented by enforcement, both 
government/public and private, e.g. class actions. After developing the discussion of the goals 
and regulatory choices, we will turn to deterrence and the role of the class action in providing 
back-end securities regulation.184  
Investor protection has long been linked to the securities class action. The litigation roots 
of the 10b-5 claims are in traditional torts based on personal economic injury and have continued 
to evolve as the claim has been redefined as a class action focused on more collective decisions 
reflecting market intermediation of investor choices. Although we do not recount all of the 
investor protection arguments here, the thrust is the class action’s effectiveness in protecting 
investors—despite its shortcomings, including a lack of significant compensation and potentially 
excessive costs for a largely diversified investor pool. We acknowledge these issues, though, as 
we explore in Part B of this Section, many reforms to the securities class action have worked to 
reduce these concerns.185  
In the core securities setting, when an investor is buying or selling securities, regulation 
addresses informational asymmetries—issuers and their managers (and sometimes other traders) 
know more about the intangible interests being traded, and these parties’ incentives to disclose 
are less than perfect.186 Offerors have inadequate incentives to disclose for various reasons, 
including, for example, worries about revealing valuable information that competitors can use.187 
In addition, shares traded in the market are not fungible across companies. The value of one 
company is different from another, and investors are not all experts or commercial operators.188 
Disclosure helps to fill the gaps between offerors and investors, and standardized disclosures 
allow investors to compare offerors to each other before investing. Regulations that cut across 
issuers help to create a baseline from which all offerors and investors can operate on an equal 
basis, without fear of the competitive concerns or the impact of private costs of disclosure on 
                                                 
184 There are, of course, additional goals beyond disclosure and enforcement. Both the 1933 and 1934 
Acts have important provisions directed toward cabining the selling process. See Robert B. Thompson & 
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investors, also have aspects of publicness.189 A socially optimal level of disclosure, and one that 
is evenly applied, arguably requires a public mandatory system, rather than private ordering.190 
Good disclosures, with the market as an intermediary, will in turn attract capital and facilitate 
growth and innovation. 
Securities regulations directed toward corporate governance (think proxy regulations, for 
example) extend investor protection beyond the buying or selling context. Investors who buy 
shares become shareholders with governance concerns about the entity. For example, when there 
is a specialization of function in these entities and managers have control over large amounts of 
the investors’ money, there is a gap between the interests of these two sets of participants. Thus, 
one of the goals of securities regulation is tied to corporate governance, with the idea that a 
strong securities disclosure system can help monitor corporate managers and agency costs.191 
Securities regulation through mandatory and equal disclosure will decrease the monitoring costs 
that investors face,192 and that, in turn, will help the market to attract capital and improve capital 
allocation.193 Here again private class action litigation aids in enforcement, helping to police 
disclosures and creating pressure on the officers and directors to be forthright in information 
provision. Disclosure and enforcement that mediate the space between investors and issuers are 
also in the publicness space, creating a market that attracts issuers as well as the capital of 
investors more broadly. 
The securities regulatory impulse also supports goals beyond investor protection and 
corporate governance to include market development and innovation, as well as economic 
growth. These goals reflect how investor/shareholders share the benefits of regulation along with 
other groups in society. Securities regulations and disclosure, for example, aid in price setting 
and, thus, allocative efficiency.194 Capital is scarce, and pricing is important to achieving an 
efficient allocation of it.195 The idea is that if we calibrate disclosure properly and ensure its 
evenness, the result will be to improve the accuracy of the pricing of securities, where accuracy 
is about pricing that corresponds with the value of the companies.196 Of course, in economic 
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terms, an efficient allocation of capital will allow the issuers to access capital and to grow and, 
thereby, promote economic growth overall and redound to the benefit of individual investors as 
well.197 Securities regulation can also decrease the cost of capital by increasing transparency and 
diminishing informational asymmetries.198 As a result, potential shareholders get easier and 
equal access to information, and that, in turn, facilitates investment, again, across companies and 
the market.199 Thus, the benefit of the regulation is a public, as well as a private, one, a form of 
publicness, and an outcome that is a public benefit exceeding the private benefit of disclosure.200  
Disclosure and allocative efficiency are also important to the development and 
maintenance of a competitive and active capital market and a competitive market, in turn, 
improves access to capital and promotes innovation.201 Evidence supports the idea that countries 
with active securities markets have higher levels of economic growth, which, in turn, favor 
innovation and new entrants into the market.202 Thus, to the extent that disclosure allocates 
capital and facilitates an active market, it also helps to promote growth and innovation – the 
point of the regulation in the first place and another way in which publicness undergirds the 
goals of the regulatory system.203  
Even the more specific investor protection goals with which we started have a publicness 
component. Securities regulation and enforcement both facilitate investor confidence more 
generally, which is vital to belief in the market and, thereby, to growth and innovation.204 
Consider the roots of the federal securities laws. The initial set of securities laws arose after the 
1929 stock market crash and the Great Depression that followed.205 There was a perception that 
the Depression may have been prolonged by a lack of confidence in the markets.206 No one, 
issuer or shareholder, wants to participate in a rigged market.207 Thus, regulation to preserve and 
maintain investor confidence helps to build strong and fluid markets.208 This need for investor 
protection beyond individual transactions grows as the number of market participants grows, and 
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with more than half of the households in the United States owning equities either directly or 
through mutual funds or retirement accounts, its importance has increased.209 Indeed, although 
investor protection is at the core here, the impulse extends beyond the traditional issuer/investor, 
purchaser/seller context, to a larger concern about markets generally, as well as the deadening 
effect of crashes on growth. This is yet another example of how, as the number of investors 
increases and the concerns about market and economic growth broaden, publicness acquires a 
greater importance in the regulatory scheme.  
In fact, when Congress described the necessity for regulation in the 1934 Act, its focus 
was not just investor effects but “national emergencies, which produce widespread 
unemployment and the dislocations of trade, transportation and industry…and adversely affect 
the general welfare.”210 The national economic collapse that followed the financial crisis in 2008, 
and the Dodd-Frank Act enacted in response to it, reflected a similar publicness focus with the 
added concerns of systemic risk and financial stability.  
These latter concerns are arguably the most robust in terms of publicness.211 In many 
financial institutions securities transactions are intertwined with those in adjacent regulatory 
areas; when one collapses (or comes near to collapse) others can as well.212 The result, as in 
2008, is financial instability and systemic risk, and the prescription in Dodd-Frank in 2010 was 
regulatory oversight.213 There are many critics of the regulatory system and whether the U.S. has 
achieved an appropriate regulatory structure and balance;214 nevertheless, there is general 
agreement that oversight is necessary to help prevent excessive risk taking and the jeopardy to 
stability that risks can create.215 As a result, regulation and publicness go hand in hand. 
B. Market Efficiency Theory, Market Intermediation, Deterrence, and Securities 
Regulation  
The key means to achieve the securities regulatory goals just described have been 
disclosures coupled with effective enforcement of those obligations.216 The Rule 10b-5 class 
                                                 
209 INVESTMENT CO. INST., EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (2008). 
210 15 U.S.C. § 78(b). See also Urska Velikonja, Distortion Apart from Price Distortion, (2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with Washington University Law Review) (discussing the distortions 
that fraudulent disclosures can cause in employment and firms across the market). 
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action is key to the private enforcement of those obligations.217 We begin this section by 
exploring the role that market efficiency has played in both disclosure and enforcement. To do 
so, we develop the concept of market intermediation, focusing on the market as an essential actor 
and accepted intermediary between issuers and investors both in enforcement and disclosure. 
The direct contact between buyer and seller visible in the structure of the original securities laws 
has given way to a mostly indirect relationship intermediated through markets. As a result, 
investor communication has moved far from its original, direct contact focus, and fraud 
enforcement has come to focus on the collective relationship more than the individual, and in 
doing so, has reshaped expectations about and the theoretical foundations of the private cause of 
action. Market efficiency concepts are important to both the front end and back end of securities 
regulation.  
In the middle part of this section we set out the hybrid rationale that has replaced the 
compensation theory and is based on deterrence to provide the desired enforcement. Deterrence 
here follows from private class actions pursued by investors who have economic losses and Rule 
10b-5 standing, but whose claims are bounded by procedural limits to prevent the possibility of 
over-deterrence through excessive payments to mostly diversified claimants. Finally, we argue 
that the collective focus flowing from the market-based intermediation characteristics of today’s 
securities transactions, combined with deterrence enforcement concerns, pushes the traditional 
investor protection goals of securities regulation much closer to the construct of publicness goals 
we elucidated above. 
Securities disclosure regulations have evolved to reflect, to a much greater degree than at 
its origins, the intermediary role of the market, with market efficiency as a proxy just as it is in 
the class action context. Consider, first, the initial (1933) approach to offering disclosures. 
Required disclosures had to be complete and distinct from any other disclosure regardless of 
issuer size. Documents had to be placed into the hands of potential and actual investors.218 
Today, the integrated disclosure system means that information required by the 1933 Act can be 
met by disclosures pursuant to the 1934 Act, and these disclosures no longer need be provided 
directly to prospective purchasers.219 One of the key aspects of the integrated disclosure reforms 
is the Form S-3, the filing required for equity issuances by large issuers like, for example, 
Halliburton.220 Form S-3 greatly abbreviated the disclosures required for offerings by eligible 
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218 Thompson & Langevoort, supra note 184, at 1575 (describing purposes of American securities 
regulation). 
219 47 FR 11380; Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and 
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 811-12 (1985). 
220 47 FR 11380. See also Henry Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable Past and an 
Uncertain Future, 4 ANN. REV. FINAN. ECON, 179, 184 (2012). 
MARKET INTERMEDIATION, PUBLICNESS, AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS 
 
39 
filers, allowing them to incorporate prior filings by reference.221 The idea here is that those 
companies are heavily traded and followed and release considerable information that is 
impounded into stock prices and into the market on a regular basis.222  
The SEC’s adopting release for the integrated-disclosure regulations specifically cited the 
efficient market theory in support of its deregulatory changes.223 The release, in fact, went even 
further, stating that the “market operates efficiently for S-3 companies,”224 and disclosures from 
the companies are “disseminated and accounted for by the marketplace.”225 This is an 
information-impoundment theory of market efficiency. The explicit reliance on the efficient 
market theory, even if overstated,226 lends support to our theory that belief in some measure of 
market efficiency through information-impoundment, and the correlative innovation and growth, 
is both a front-end and a back-end aspect of securities regulation and, arguably, important to the 
publicness aspect of the market.227 
The SEC’s reliance on market efficiency in propounding this rule change is important for 
another reason as well. It reveals industry’s reliance on market intermediation. The SEC adopted 
this rule change in response to deregulatory pressure, and reliance on the theory of market 
efficiency helped to justify a pro-industry change.228 As a result, integrated disclosure became a 
cost-savings measure for issuers and is now an ingrained aspect of our regulatory system. Thus, 
for the issuers who rely on this front-end, market intermediation, measure, it is arguably 
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disingenuous to claim a lack of similar intermediation on the back end when deterrence and 
enforcement – and belief in the market are at stake.229  
Form S-3 and integrated disclosure are not the only places where market intermediation 
plays a front-end, offering-based role. Consider Rule 415 for shelf offerings.230 This Rule is also 
part of the integration reforms and here, too, the SEC referred explicitly to market efficiency in 
its adopting release.231 This Rule allows issuers to register securities on a delayed basis, 
essentially stating that the issuer plans, at some point, when the market is favorable, to sell 
securities, and the continuous disclosure regime of the 1934 Act provides the requisite 
disclosures.232 The provision increases issuer flexibility and options, as well as increasing cost 
savings.233 It, too, was premised on the connection between information impoundment and stock 
prices,234 and it is now an ingrained part of the regulatory system. 
Similarly, the 2005 offering reforms, which provided fewer restrictions on the offering 
process for publicly traded companies than for their counterparts making their initial public 
offering, are also arguably based on market intermediation, even if not explicitly.235 Thus, the 
argument goes, the informational asymmetries and other investor protection concerns are fewer 
and the need for regulatory layers less.236 The same might also be said of the decision to decrease 
holding periods for the resale of restricted securities of companies making required periodic 
disclosures to the market.237 As a result, these provisions rely at least indirectly on the market 
intermediation and the market efficiency theory. Here, too, the idea is that information on these 
companies is already available and a market already exists for their securities.238 In short, 
information impoundment, market efficiency, and market intermediation loom in the background 
of many front-end offering regulations and reforms.   
To be sure, our understanding of market efficiency, or at least that of the finance 
theorists, has changed since the time of Basic.239  We know that the assumptions undergirding 
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the theory of market efficiency – complete information and rational actors – are more nuanced 
than some of the initial broad presentations of the theory. Information is costly.240 Transaction 
costs exist.241 Noise plays a role in the markets.242 And, people trade in securities for many 
reasons that are not rational.243 Nevertheless, our reliance on these market theories remains, both 
on the front-end, offering side, and, as Halliburton II made clear, on the back-end, enforcement 
side.  
The reason for this continued reliance, we believe, is that the goals for regulation, both 
investor-oriented and publicness in nature, as well as the need for belief in market efficiency and 
fairness are too important to discard. As a result, the regulatory system deploys market efficiency 
to elide gaps in theory, to enable both capital raising and deregulation. A similar pattern is visible 
on the deterrence/enforcement side, with litigation that supports the goals of securities 
regulation. Efficiency on the front end thus implies efficiency on the back end, an example of the 
type of second-best theoretical solution that is the nature of the regulatory enterprise and 
litigation more generally.  
Class action theory has easily adjusted to the widespread acceptance of the intermediary 
role of the market in disclosure and enforcement just discussed. But some effects of the growth 
in the sophistication of markets and their participants since the inception of the federal securities 
laws have created additional challenges for theories seeking to explain the class action. As 
discussed in Part II, a compensation theory alone cannot support the class-action mechanism as it 
currently works.244 It is widely understood that the investors who receive payments receive only 
a small percentage of their alleged losses.245 Payments in this context tend to be circular, with 
today’s shareholders paying the settlement costs of harms to yesterday’s, with attorneys’ fees 
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reducing the payments.246 In short, compensation really does not occur and, as a result, cannot be 
used as a justification for the class-action regime.  
The same, however, cannot be said of deterrence. Indeed, Congress reiterated the role of 
deterrence and the importance of the class action in that space when it passed the PSLRA.247 The 
Supreme Court did the same in opinions discussed in this Article.248 Even if less than “optimal,” 
deterrence, whether actual or perceived, continues to have considerable traction in the debates 
about the class action.249 This is true even though it is well understood that the lack of payments 
by individual officers and directors, and the role of insurance, likely diminish the specific 
deterrence value of the claims250 and that the specific application of deterrence theories lack the 
necessary nuance to sustain a general theory.251 
Many academics have raised these concerns. Professors Jackson and Roe describe the 
conventional academic view of securities litigation as “seriously compromised.”252 Professor 
Fisch presents the academic literature as reflecting a “general consensus that the traditional 
justifications for private litigation are deficient and that the rationale for private litigation must 
be reconsidered.”253 And there have been many proposals for what would work better: enhanced 
government enforcement; SEC approval of class actions;254 stock exchanges in charge of 
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deterrence;255 sanctions against managers personally;256 or regulation of incentives of those who 
bring suits.257 
The Supreme Court is seemingly untroubled by such inconsistencies; the Congress has 
hardly batted an eye toward any of the alternative solutions. Instead, what we have is a hybrid 
private class action with elements of deterrence as a form of enforcement and some minimal 
compensation, built on the frame of what has gone before and adapted to do justice in the 
securities transaction world we have. In short, class actions provide shareholders recovery (and 
attorneys with a share of it) for losses after misrepresentations. But, they also function as a 
necessary and effective deterrent of misconduct that adversely affects the market as a whole. 
Indeed, the class action has become a known commodity in the deterrence arsenal in a way that 
public enforcement has not matched. Now, investors who purchased or sold after a 
misrepresentation and who meet the elements of Rule 10b-5, have standing to bring a cause of 
action under the holding of Blue Chip Stamps, assuming they have an economic loss meeting the 
prerequisites of Dura. Nevertheless, the scienter pleading requirements and other provisions of 
the PSLRA permit the weeding out of many questionable suits before discovery and its expense 
even begin.258 Further, the elements of materiality and loss causation, even though pushed back 
to a later time in the litigation process, shape anticipated damages for any settlement discussions. 
These changes have combined to diminish, but not eliminate, the circularity concerns of the 
diversified investors—including attorney’s fees and litigation costs—who are potentially on both 
sides of these cases. For these, we are left with a choice: deterrence through litigation as 
compared to the costs and benefits for other alternatives, including, for example, the 
development of a merits-based, front-end regulatory system – a choice the U.S. has eschewed in 
favor of disclosure and back-end fraud enforcement.259  
Finally, this is where our expansion of the theory of the securities regulatory impulse to 
include publicness goals comes into play. The reason for the resilience of deterrence and the role 
it plays, we posit, is that it is connected to the goals of investor protection and market regulation 
and to publicness. And, here is where the class action has evolved and where our understanding 
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of deterrence must also evolve. We need to assure all investors, not just individual ones or even 
issuer-specific ones, that the market is “policed” so that they will be encouraged to invest.260 
Additionally, deterrence matters for those not in the market but impacted by crashes and 
downturns. Enforcement and deterrence thus go hand-in-hand. In that sense, then, deterrence, 
even if not easily measured, accomplished, or tied to specific harms, remains vital to the 
securities regulatory goals, including the increasing role of publicness in those goals. Securities 
fraud, if unchecked, creates a market in which no one, not offerors, buyers, or sellers, wants to 
participate. Simply put, fairness, and the belief in it, matters to market participants and, thus, to 
growth and innovation.  
The answer to the application of Halliburton II, and the role of the securities class actions 
more generally, then, lies in our acceptance of the need for strong securities markets that help to 
generate innovation and growth. Class actions, as we have argued, play an important role in 
policing and protecting the market and ensuring its strength. The market works to allocate capital 
from investors to users. Issuers rely on the market, and indirectly, its efficiency and 
intermediation, to access capital. Capital allocation, in turn, supports growth and innovation, but 
only when belief in the market’s fairness is sustained. The result is that the class action, too, has 
evolved to encompass publicness and, therefore, the emphasis on specific investor 
harm/compensation has diminished, while the focus on deterrence of harm to the market or to a 
larger class of diversified investors has grown.  
Of course, our concerns about fairness, innovation, and growth, as well as about 
information as a public good, support the disclosure, or front-end regulatory side we previously 
discussed.261 Importantly, however, they also support the back-end, enforcement aspect as well – 
by providing a mechanism to deter fraudulent disclosures, which harm the market, and belief in 
it, as a whole. Viewed through the publicness lens, then, class actions play not just a direct, 
investor protection role, they also play a larger role in policing and supporting the market, which 
in turn fuels growth and innovation. It is for those reasons, we posit, that the securities fraud 
class action endures and receives continued support from Congress and the Court. Although not 
free from downsides, the class action is an important part of the mechanisms that protect the 
market and thereby make it function as a place that attracts capital, issuers, and investors, which, 
in turn, promotes innovation and growth for investors and citizens alike. In short, however 
messy, the class action arguably endures because:  
1. a strong market is important to growth through innovation and capital 
allocation,  
2. a belief in a “fair” and “efficient” market is a predicate to a strong market, 
and 
3. an enforcement regime, both public and private (class actions), is a 
predicate to a belief in a strong market.  
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C. The Role of Market Intermediation in Reliance and Price Impact 
As we noted earlier, the Rule 10b-5 class action is a back-end enforcement tool that has 
endured repeated assaults by judges, legislators, regulators, practitioners, and academics. Dura, 
Amgen, and both Halliburton cases are recent examples of the Court’s reluctance to make 
wholesale changes to it in the post-PSLRA era. This reluctance is tied to both the goals of 
regulation and the endurance of deterrence and enforcement concerns. Yet, like the regulatory 
goals and the accompanying front-end regulatory structure, the class action’s role, as well as its 
shape and requirements, has been shifting over the years. The evolving cause of action and the 
role of the market in that evolution is where we turn next. 
1. Market Intermediation and the Evolution of 10b-5 Claims 
The fraud-on-the-market theory generally, and the role of reliance more specifically, have 
both developed along with the securities markets. Understanding the evolution of the cause of 
action requires an examination of open-market trading and the role it plays in linking buyers and 
sellers, both with respect to reliance and the measure of damages. Given the realities of open-
market, anonymous transactions, some aspects of the traditional common-law tort of fraud do 
not, and cannot, directly apply. The claims of individual investors, even if made in direct reliance 
on a misstatement, are rarely worth the cost of litigating and, therefore, are not litigated. As 
previously stated, the class action remedies this collective-action problem and plays an important 
enforcement role.262 The traditional understanding of reliance, however, was a challenge to the 
development of an effective open-market collective claim. Its role was to provide a link between 
purchasers and misstatements that would address concerns about overcompensation and 
circularity, but it is not subject to proof in a traditional common-law manner, and, even if it were, 
would be different for each and every person. As a result, it would defeat the predominance 
requirement and, thereby, class certification. Here is where the fraud-on-the-market presumption 
does its work. It facilitates the class action and thus, provides enforcement and a deterrence 
check on fraud.263 
These are the key core principles the Court reaffirmed in the key cases described in this 
article.264 Halliburton II made clear that Basic’s presumption remains sound. As a group, the 
opinions reiterate the policy reasons undergirding the fraud-on-the-market approach. In short, 
relying on the market as an intermediary for the purposes of the reliance element is both 
necessary and appropriate for open-market transactions.265  
To say that the fraud-on-the-market theory is necessary and appropriate, however, is 
insufficient. Its existence means that we have already decided that reliance is necessarily 
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different here than in traditional fraud cases. Open-market transactions are understandably 
distinct from their common law counterparts. Market intermediation intervenes and leaves us 
with the question of whether a causal connection should be required at all and, if so, what it 
should look like.  
Consider the development of market intermediation in securities fraud claims. Movement 
away from the strictures of common law and toward recognition of the nature of market-based 
transactions was occurring in the federal courts for more than two decades before Basic.266 The 
Supreme Court first relaxed the reliance standard in securities claims in 1970.267 The specific use 
of fraud on the market in 10b-5 cases was already well-accepted by the lower federal courts 
when the Supreme Court embraced it.268 Academics had also begun to support its adoption. For 
example, Professor Dan Fischel saw fraud on the market as an appealing approach to securities 
fraud and the element of reliance as inconsistent with it.269 He was later joined in this view by his 
frequent co-author and now federal judge, Frank Easterbrook.270 The result was that the 
requirement of a transactional connection between fraudster and plaintiff gave way to a market-
based adaptation.271  
That an adaptation should occur is not surprising – both in light of the way that torts have 
evolved more generally,272 and the larger goals of securities and market regulation discussed 
earlier. Torts scholars John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky describe how Basic replaced a 
cause of action based on the injury of deceit, or being tricked to buy stock, with one based on 
economic harm resulting from price distortions that follow defendant’s misrepresentations – 
irrespective of reliance. This theory provides a broader notion of what can count as wrongful 
injury, where reliance is not required, but the cause of action is still legitimate given 
Congressional and Court action.273 
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Judge Easterbrook’s more restrictive look at the interaction of the merits and procedure after his academic 
writing with Fischel and before his 2010 opinion in Schliecher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2010), an 
opinion that is favorably cited in the Halliburton cases. See Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as 
Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of Fraud on the Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207 (2015). 
271 Fisch, supra note 13.  
272 Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29. 
273 Id.  
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Within the securities academy some scholars have argued that the only link necessary to 
satisfy reliance is one to a distortion in market price.274 Others have suggested eliminating 
reliance entirely.275 The focus for the securities scholars, as for the torts scholars, is that the 
investors’ relation to the fraud is intermediated through the market.276 This difference matters 
because it shifts our focus from the personal to the market and from compensation to deterrence, 
the theory we have described as key to market protection in a world of publicness.  
This debate centers on whether the original purpose of reliance, linking a defendant’s 
wrongdoing to a change in behavior of a specific injured party, is as important as it once was. 
The work that reliance does in this market-centered circumstance is to prevent misrepresentors 
from becoming insurers to all market purchasers.277 The concern lurking behind the reliance link 
is about overcompensation with respect to individual purchasers who are now grouped into a 
class. 278 Those concerns have, however, been addressed in multiple ways. Recall the role of the 
PSLRA in dealing with overcompensation and the perceived strike-suit value of these claims. 
Lead plaintiffs must now receive court approval. Complaints must survive stringent pleading 
standards and are subject to a stay on discovery until they do so. Further, plaintiffs must still 
prove loss causation, which provides a connection to the harm, and they must also prove 
materiality and scienter.279 Although these reforms have generally been debated in the context of 
strike suits and compensation when no fraud occurred, in fact, all of these reforms also help to 
diminish the likelihood of overcompensation through circularity. After all, if we sort good from 
bad claims at the front end of the litigation, and there is evidence that the process has 
improved,280 it is reasonable to be less concerned about the damages on the back end. That 
argument is, at least in part, what undergirds theories that support the elimination of reliance as 
an element in market-based situations. 
                                                 
274 Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Rethinking Basic, 69 BUS. LAWYER 671, 696 (2014). 
275 Fischel, supra note 267. 
276 See generally Langevoort, supra note 35, at 198 (discussing Basic as providing investors a right to 
rely on undistorted price). 
277 Eliminating or eliding reliance arguably pushes our understanding of the claim toward one about 
deterrence rather than compensation. Amanda Rose, Fraud on the Market: An Action Without A Cause, 
160 U. PA. L. REV. 87 (2011). 
278 Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1200-01 (2013). Concerns about 
whether permitting open market traders, trading with anonymous investors in the market, who are neither 
the defendants nor connected to them other than through trades on distorted prices, creates a risk of 
overcompensation has been the topic of much scholarly literature. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 
182; Velikonja, supra note 197. The money to pay these investors comes from the corporate treasury of 
the investors’ own company or insurance policies purchased with company dollars which compounds the 
worry. See Fisch, supra note 182, at 337. 
279 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014). 
280 See generally, Pritchard & Sale, supra note 71. 
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The growth in scholarly literature against reliance in a market based 10b-5 claim, along 
with what we now know was a vigorous debate among the justices in the majority in Basic, 
nevertheless supports a continuing, if increasingly limited, role for reliance by providing for the 
fraud on the market presumption to be rebuttable.281 The majority in Halliburton II provides for 
this rebuttal to be contested at the class certification point of litigation.282 Yet, it turns out that in 
light of the opinions we have analyzed in this Article, and the role of the market as intermediary, 
the rebuttal space is appropriately, narrowly cabined. 
As a result, the argument about reliance now goes something like this: scienter-based, 
material misrepresentations that distort the market price usually give rise to a cause of action, but 
some are too remote. The three examples that the Court provided in Basic tell us something 
about what was worrying the Court. The first two indicate that the “remote” group includes 
misrepresentations by defendants that are effectively countered by other information, either from 
market makers who already know the correct information or from corrective information that 
enters the market and dissipates the effect of the misstatement. The third is of a plaintiff who 
knows the defendant’s statement is false but trades anyway because of an apparently unrelated 
motive related to an antitrust problem. This last example illustrates what Goldberg and Zipursky 
describe as a “volenti” concern.283 Virtually every tort deems certain actions by the plaintiffs 
sufficient to limit or foreclose a claim, including consent and unjustified reliance. These tort 
limitations are usually posed as affirmative defenses, and in securities fraud, allow for situations 
in which, even if there is a price distortion and the market is efficient, the claim can be 
foreclosed. That type of plaintiff is a “willing” market participant, and, therefore, not entitled to a 
remedy.284  
Importantly, however, the space covered by these three illustrations has shrunk 
noticeably in the time since Basic –given the precise attention that Congress and the Court have 
paid to possible overcompensation. More specifically, the first two examples today would likely 
be addressed by a court under a truth-on-the-market analysis, a materiality question, which, after 
Amgen, we know is not appropriate at class certification.285  
                                                 
281 Zipursky and Goldberg also note that Basic does more than create the presumption. The Court’s 
theory also allows plaintiffs to use circumstantial evidence to support their argument that the defendant’s 
misstatement distorted the market price. It works like this: if the issuer’s securities are traded in an 
efficient market and a material misstatement is made to the public, it can be presumed that the 
misrepresentation caused a price distortion. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29. 
282 And the chances of Congress acting to “revisit the entire remedial approach in the fraud-on-the-
market setting, enabling private litigation but making it more clearly a deterrence-based mechanism” are 
non-existent in the foreseeable future. See Langevoort, supra note 13, at 59. 
283 Reflecting the Latin term. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 29, at 1795. 
284 Basic presents this example in the context of an individual investor, but in the usual class action 
setting it would be relevant for the class as a whole—defendant would have to show that individual issues 
predominated over common issues on this question. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1987). 
285  See e.g., Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F 2d. 509 (7th Cir. 1989). 
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Next, recall that in Amgen the Court also emphasized that the class action inquiry is a 
narrow one. The purpose of the inquiry at certification is not to adjudicate the merits of the 
claim, but to ensure that the requisites of FCRP 23(b)(3) are met, with the focus largely on 
whether questions common to the class predominate. The purpose is to determine whether a class 
action is the appropriate method for resolving the claim. Defendants, of course, are motivated to 
push forward to class certification any issue on which they can gain traction. Amgen, however, 
makes clear that courts should resist efforts to move what are truly issues for trial, or the back 
end of these cases, to class certification, or the front end of these cases. The failure of courts to 
do so will defeat the role and power of certification, create mini-trials and merit creep, and 
eliminate the enforcement aspect of the litigation. 
Halliburton I and Amgen illustrate an additional principle that is important to 
understanding the price impact evidence as tied to market efficiency. In Halliburton I, the Court 
rejected the defendants’ attempt to require proof of loss causation, a Time 2 issue, and proof of 
materiality, a Time 1 issue, at class certification. In doing so, the Court specifically said that 
proof and these issues were appropriately left to trial. Yet, the Halliburton defendants have now 
attempted to take the evidence they amassed on Time 2/loss causation and deploy it to disprove 
market efficiency at Time 1. If sustained, this argument will eliminate the line drawn in 
Halliburton I and allow market efficiency fights to be consumed with proof on loss causation 
and debates about materiality. As a result, although defendants now have the opportunity to rebut 
the market efficiency presumption at class certification, the space for doing so is, in fact, quite 
small. Indeed, courts must keep in mind that: 1) the defendants bear the burden of proof; 2) the 
inquiry is narrow; and 3) the elements of loss causation and materiality cannot be conflated with 
market efficiency either in fact or in proof. The failure to do so will result in a situation in which 
the procedure is allowed to swallow the substance.286 
Finally, the third Basic rebuttal issue, the volenti context, presents an interesting case. 
Note that the example in Basic (and also the one that Justices Brennan and Blackmun debated in 
their exchange prior to the decision) related to an individual investor. In the typical class context 
of 10b-5 litigation, the focus would be on whether such a motivation accrued to the class, or 
perhaps to enough members of the class that a credible argument could be made that individual 
issues would predominate over collective ones. A single individual with such a motivation 
                                                 
286 Early class certification opinions following Halliburton II are beginning to develop some limitations. 
For example, a Florida trial court ruled that a truth-on-the market defense, which goes to materiality, may 
not be used at the class certification stage to prove an absence of price impact and show a lack of 
predominance. See Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners Inc., 302 F.R.D. 657 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (lack of 
price impact treated as materiality that would defeat the arguments of the entire class and is better left for 
trial stage). See also Local 703, Int’l Bhd. of T., Grocery & Food Emps Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. 
Corp., No. CV-10-J-2847-S, 2014 WL 6661918 at *1, *9 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014); Ganino v. Citizens 
United, 228 F.3d 154, 167 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[A] misrepresentation is immaterial if the information is 
already known to the market because the misrepresentation cannot then defraud the market”); Fisch, 
supra note 13, at 928 (“price distortion is closely related to materiality”). 
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should not, in the market-as-intermediary world, block a class lest the mechanism and 
enforcement power be defeated.287 
2. Market Intermediation and Price Impact 
The next step is to take what we know about the market as intermediary and reliance and 
apply it to price impact. The Halliburton I Court described price impact as “the effect of a 
misrepresentation on a stock price.”288 Questions about burden of proof and others issues should 
be resolved by reference to the learning about market intermediation in securities class actions as 
reaffirmed in Halliburton II and the other Supreme Court cases discussed in this article. Lower 
courts have begun to do exactly that.289 Courts should beware of conflating price impact with 
price movement; otherwise, the lack of price movement will result in a finding of lack of price 
impact, particularly if the price movement analysis focuses only on the time of the initial 
fraud.290  Such an approach is over-inclusive. There are several circumstances in which a price 
might be impacted by a misstatement and not change or not change much, if measured at the 
time of the fraud. Consider the following seven situations, only two of which would 
appropriately be addressed in the price impact space defined by Halliburton II. 
1. Misstatement, but allegation that there is not an efficient market (for 
example not enough analysts following a stock or enough liquidity to 
generate sufficient information for efficient trading). This situation is 
specifically covered by footnote 27 of Basic and would seem appropriate 
for resolution at class certification. 
                                                 
287 The separate question as to whether the individual plaintiff can be the class representative has been 
carved away by Amgen and Halliburton II. See supra Part III, B. 
288 Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2187 (2011). 
289 The holding of the Halliburton trial court on remand after Halliburton II seems consistent with this 
narrow space for the rebuttal of the presumption, but still leaves room for additional litigation based on 
dueling event studies. The trial court measured the absence of price impact at the time of the correction, 
not the time of the misrepresentation, and it placed the burden of proof on the defendant to prove the lack 
of price impact. It then certified the class as to one of the asbestos misrepresentations when the 
company’s price had dropped 40%, but found the defendants had rebutted the presumption on five other 
dates. See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., No. 3:02-CV-1152-M, 2015 WL 4522863, at *1 
(N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015) (relying in substantial part on Fox, supra note 62).  See also the cases in note 
286 supra. 
290 The Halliburton defendants argued for visible and statistically significant price movement both when 
they were asserting that plaintiffs must prove price impact and later in seeking to rebut the presumption.  
See Defendants’ Brief on Price Impact, Demonstrating that Class Certification Must Be Denied at 2, Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 2015 WL 4522863 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (No. 3:02-CV-1152-M) (“If 
the ‘stock price did not increase’ following the alleged misrepresentation that is evidence of no price 
impact”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179 (No. 09-1403), 2011 WL 
1541295 (“All they had to do was show one day during that class period statistically significant price 
movement, and they’re in.”). 
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2. Misstatement, but allegation that there was no publicity of the 
misstatement—even where there is an efficient market for the stock. This 
is specially covered by footnote 27 of Basic and would seem appropriate 
for resolution at class certification. 
3. Misstatement, but allegation that it was not material. This is also listed in 
footnote 27 of Basic, but given the holding of Amgen, would not be 
appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
4. Misstatement, but defendant is not able to prove statistically significant 
price impact so as to satisfy event study methodology regularly used in 
modern securities class actions.291 Given the holding of Halliburton II, this 
context would not be appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
5. Misstatement, but the only price impact is attributable to an alternative or 
intervening cause. Given the holding of Halliburton I, this would not be 
appropriate for resolution at class certification. 
6. Misstatement, but the defendant contests it. This would be resolved at 
motion to dismiss, and, if not, at trial per Amgen.  
7. Misstatement, but in context of price maintenance, i.e. allegation the 
misstatement sought to prop up price in the face of new information that 
would have led to decline. This is not raised in footnote 27, nor 
Halliburton II, but the recent Supreme Court cases evidence this fact 
pattern, and lower courts have upheld 10b-5 claims in price maintenance 
cases without price movement at Time 1. 
This series of fact patterns illustrates two outcomes as to price impact. First, the effect of 
the misrepresentation may sometimes occur even though the price itself does not move at the 
time of the misrepresentation. The result is that rebuttal of the presumption would not be 
appropriate. Second, class certification cannot, and should not, resolve all issues in which there is 
no effect of the misrepresentation on price.  
The Halliburton facts illustrate the former, which is example 7, even though the Court itself did 
not address the issue. In Halliburton, the plaintiffs’ initial allegations fell into three categories: 
asbestos litigation liability, construction contract revenues, and merger cost savings. With respect 
to all of the statements, the plaintiffs’ claim, whether understating liability or overstating 
revenues and cost savings, is that the defendants made the misstatements in order to prevent the 
market price from dropping. For example, the allegation with respect to the asbestos litigation is 
                                                 
291 See Fox, supra note 62 (discussing two measures that might be used by courts to determine if the 
presumption has been rebutted: the first would leave defendants about where they were before 
Halliburton II, and the second would advance the essential issue of loss causation to the class certification 
point of litigation. 
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that if the issuer had been truthful about the extent of its liability, which turned out to be much 
higher than publicly stated at Time 1, the stock price would have dropped. The same is true 
about the revenue-recognition allegation on the construction contracts, where the plaintiffs claim 
that the defendants overstated the revenue and later had to correct it, as well as with respect to 
the announced cost savings from the merger that were unrealistic. These arguments all depend on 
information impoundment and market intermediation, but in the price maintenance context.292  
Notice that the structure we have developed so far leaves us with the problem that 
misrepresentations, scienter, materiality, and market efficiency are tied to Time 1, but fraud 
visibility and damages generally occur at Time 2. Thus, the liability, construction, and merger 
misrepresentations all occur at Time 1 points, but because the purpose of these announcements 
is, through market intermediation, to prevent the price of the company’s stock from falling, it is 
possible for them to both distort the price of the stock (or have a price impact) with little or no 
movement in the stock price.  
This pattern is the essence of price maintenance, and the argument, price impact without 
price movement, is common, was also made in Dura and Amgen, and is not susceptible of Time 
1, price-movement proof. Additionally, price maintenance situations reveal that it is possible to 
have an efficient market that shows little or no movement at Time 1, because the distortion 
occurred through price stabilization. In short, price distortions can exist without price movement. 
As a result, courts must review motions for class certification and fights about price impact both 
with an understanding of the types of situations that can occur, the narrowness of the allowed 
inquiry, and the maintenance issue in mind. 293 
Amgen, Halliburton II and illustration number 4 above also reveal another possibility: 
there are cases where the price does not move, but the issue should not be resolved at class 
certification because it does not go to the core class question of whether individual issues 
predominate. The majority opinion in Halliburton II acknowledges via an example that there 
remains something of a failsafe where the connection of a class of plaintiffs is so insufficiently 
tied to the alleged fraud that the remnants of reliance might be used to end even an open market 
                                                 
292 The same is arguably true of Dura and Amgen. The Dura plaintiffs argued that the defendants 
repeatedly made statements about expected sales and profits as well as impending drug approval, despite 
knowing that the neither the profits nor the drug approval were likely, including statements about the 
continued development of the drugs and progress of drug trials. See Plaintiff’s Fourth Consolidated 
Amended Complaint for Violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, In re Dura Pharms., Inc. Sec. 
Litig., No. 99-CV-0151-L(WMC), 2006 WL 3267513 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2006).; In Amgen, the plaintiffs 
argued that the defendants continued to make statements about the safety of certain drugs despite growing 
evidence to the contrary. See Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds v. Amgen, Inc., No. CV 07-2536 PSG, 
2009 WL 2633743, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2009). 
293 Many courts have recognized the effect of maintenance, even if the Supreme Court has not yet done 
so. See, e.g. McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); IBEW 
Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. August 6, 2014); In re Pfizer 
Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F Supp.2d 252, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); FindWhat Investors Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 
658 F.3d 1282, 1317 (11th Cir. 2011) (fraudulent misstatements that prolong inflation can be just as 
harmful). 
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fraud case (as opposed to scienter or misrepresentation issues resolved on motion to dismiss or 
loss causation and materiality resolved at other points in litigation).294 This example seemingly 
intrudes at least partly on the space occupied by materiality, but the overlap does not seem to be 
large.  Justice Ginsburg, author of the court’s Amgen materiality opinion just the term before, 
concurs in the Halliburton II majority briefly noting it “should impose no heavy toll on 
securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.”295 The two opinions illustrate our argument that 
the space available to contest efficiency is, in fact, quite small and is supported both by the 
publicness goals of securities regulation and by the front-end uses of market efficiency to justify 
deregulation. 
In short, reliance and the efficient market presumption as well as the narrowness of the 
rebuttal space for price impact, are supported by a more general understanding of market 
intermediation and the role it plays in supporting issuers’ access to the capital markets. A key 
prerequisite for the presumption of reliance is the existence of an efficient market. In 
Halliburton, the defendants argued that a lack of price movement revealed that the market was 
not efficient and thus the presumption was rebutted. Of course, this argument fails to account for 
price maintenance.  
Moreover, if we step back from the econometric studies and consider Halliburton’s place in the 
securities market, it raises the question of whether it passes the straight-face test for a Fortune 
500, New York Stock Exchange traded company to claim that the market for its stock lacks 
efficiency. Indeed, it is arguably disingenuous for companies, like Halliburton, who are Form S-
3 filers to take the front-end, registration-side advantages of market intermediation but deny the 
enforcement-side of it on the back end.296 
This is the point at which our construct of the regulatory goals as being motivated by 
publicness, along with market intermediation, provides traction. The answer to the specific 
application of Halliburton II, as well as the larger role of the class action more generally, lies in 
our acceptance of the need for strong securities markets. Class actions, as we have argued, are 
important for policing and protecting the market and ensuring belief in its strength. This is their 
enforcement and deterrence role, and that role, in turn, contributes to the belief in the market that 
attracts capital and creates stability. The market, of course, works to allocate capital from 
investors to users, and issuers rely on the market, its intermediation and efficiency, to access that 
capital. Capital allocation, in turn, supports growth and innovation. Market intermediation also 
plays a role in access to capital and offerings, and in deterrence, by providing the necessary 
reliance bridge for predominance, a requirement for a securities class action. These reasons, in 
                                                 
294  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415-16 (2014). 
295 See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) 
(Ginsburg J. concurring). The two views on the causal link that reliance requires may be no further apart 
than the views of Justices Brennan and Blackmun on the same point in their exchange of memoranda in 
Basic discussed above at note 158.   
296 See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989) (the court implicitly recognized this 
argument when it included S-3 filings as one measure of market efficiency). 
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combination with the case law, support our conclusion that although market efficiency inquiries 
are allowed at the class certification stage of the procedure, the inquiry is to be a narrow one that 
does not conflate loss causation or materiality with market efficiency and is mindful of price 
maintenance. Insisting on these limitations will help to avoid merit creep and mini trials. It will 
also help to ensure that the market protection essential to innovation and growth.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article develops the role that market intermediation plays in securities regulation – 
both on the front and back end. On the back end, its role reflects both concerns about the 
possibility of overcompensation and the place that enforcement plays in ensuring belief in strong 
securities markets.297 The front-end regulatory examples reveal how market intermediation 
facilitates capital formation and deregulation.298 Here, for example, it replaces other options, 
including a merits-based regulatory system. On the back end, through litigation and deterrence, 
market intermediation resolves collective action problems through the class action. In short, the 
market efficiency theory has withstood the test of time for the same reasons that industry has 
deployed it on the front end, because it is “a reasonable approximation of the truth” that both 
enables rulemaking and capital raising, as well as class-action policing of open-market fraud.299  
In sum, the securities fraud class action has evolved and endured because of the role it 
plays in enforcement and the publicness of the markets. It does so through, at least in part, 
market intermediation. As we explored, the market plays a part as an intermediary and enables 
securities regulation on the front end and, through deterrence/enforcement, on the back end. 
Thus, efficiency and intermediation on the front end correlates with efficiency and 
intermediation on the back end. In today’s world, open-market cases are different from their 
common law counterparts, and the Basic presumption recognizes that difference. It allows these 
cases to proceed and to fulfill their enforcement role. Further, the class action as modified by the 
Courts and Congress balances concerns about overcompensation with those about unchecked 
fraud and, in doing so, makes its own contribution to market efficiency. Congress chose the 
elements that should be addressed at the motion to dismiss and those that belong to the merits 
stage, resulting in a very stringent inquiry that itself verges on a dispute about the merits. Class 
certification is not designed to be, and should not be, the same. It should not become the driver, 
because if it does, procedure, and the Court’s increased willingness to indulge in it, will continue 
to result in added costs and layers of litigation with very little pay off to the litigants, the 
markets, or the public. Although this means that some cases that survive and settle will have 
merit and some will not, that is, in fact, the way the litigation system works. Indeed, viewed in 
that light, market intermediation, publicness, and the securities class action combine to yield the 
                                                 
297 It is also the product of cost benefit analysis. See Langevoort, supra note 51; Lynn A. Stout, Type I 
Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711 (1996). 
298 Not all S-3 filers, for example, are free of fraud or necessarily good candidates for shelf offerings, but 
all of them can use the provision because it is more cost effective to regulate in that fashion. 
299 Allen, supra note 239, at 559. 
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type of second-best theoretical solution that is the nature of the regulatory enterprise and 
litigation more generally. 
 
